…
Academic
integrity is not my main motivation for the AI ban. It’s a factor, but it’s not
the main thing. The main thing is that I want to help these students learn, and
using AI is directly harmful to learning. Common sense says that prompting
ChatGPT doesn’t have the same learning benefits as doing the reading and
writing yourself, but if you need something more robust than common sense,
here’s a sampling of the research literature.
…
There are two basic reasons for
this and to make these clear I’m going to go way back to Augustine of Hippo’s
ancient, uncompleted treatise De Musica.
I’ve quoted from Augustine
extensively in the past because I have been annoyed at how he has been
misrepresented (or misconstrued) by some pop-level depictions of him. I have also taken some issue with
philosophers like the late Roger Scruton concluding that since the neo-Platonic
cosmology Augustine subscribed to has been discredited there is nothing to be
gained from seriously dwelling on his ideas about music.
Well, Scruton was wrong. I’ll demonstrate Scruton was wrong by quoting from Augustine and showing that he articulated two basic points about the nature of music which are human capacities that should not just be farmed out to AI. Both of them are relatively obvious. The first one is art is a product of human reason:
https://archive.org/details/augustine-on-music-de-musica
Page
178
M.
But don’t you think art is a sort of reason, and those who use art use reason?
Or do you think otherwise?
D.
It seems so.
M.
Therefore, whoever cannot use reason does not use art. [emphasis added]
Page
179
M.
… But if all imitation is art, and all art reason, all imitation is reason. But
an irrational animal does not use reason; therefore, it does not possess an
art. But it is capable of imitation; therefore art is not imitation.
Page
185
…
M.
Then tell me, which is to be considered dearer, what is contained in our
intellect or what is accidentally attributed to us by the judgment of an
ignorant people?
D.
No one doubts the first is far above all others, even those things which are
not to be thought ours.
M.
And so you don’t deny, do you, all science is contained in the intellect?
[emphasis added]
D.
Who does?
M.
And, therefore, music is in the intellect.
D. That seems to follow from its definition.
Whoever cannot use reason does not use art. The first reason to avoid using AI to do your musical analytic thinking for you is, if you use it, you are abrogating the first and most important thing about music as an art, or any art, according to Augustine’s thoughts about what makes music an art to begin with.
Is that an appeal to an authority? Sure, but since hardly anyone has done much to improve upon Augustine’s observation in roughly sixteen centuries the appeal to authority isn’t invalid or unsound in this case.
Now, we get to the second thing, which will take a bit longer to unpack:
Book
VI, Chapter 3
Chapter
3
M.
Notice, then, this third kind, being in the practice and operation of the
person pronouncing, and see whether these numbers can be without those in the
memory. For silent within ourselves we can also by thinking go through certain
numbers in the amount of time they would be gone through by the voice. It is
evident these are in a certain operation of the mind which, since it produces
no sound and visits no passion on the ear, shows this kind of number can be
without the other two, namely, the one in the sound, the other in the hearer
when he hears. But we ask if it would be without memory’s accompanying it. Yet,
if the soul produces the numbers we find in the beat of the veins, the question
is solved.
Pages
329-330
M.
Consider, too, the fourth class, that is, the class of those numbers in the
memory. [emphasis added] For, if we draw them out by recollection, and,
when we are carried away to other thoughts, we again leave them as if hidden in
their own hiding places, I don’t think it is difficult to see they can be
without the others.
D.
I don’t doubt they can be without the others. But just the same, unless they
were heard or thought, they could not be sent on to the memory. And so, although they remain at the death of
those that are heard or thought, yet they are imprinted by them.
M.
I don’t contradict you, and I should like now to ask which of these four kinds
you judge the principal one. Except, I believe, while we were discussing these
things, a fifth kind appeared from somewhere, a kind in the natural judgment of
perceiving when we are delighted by the equality of numbers or offended at a
flaw in them. For I am mindful of your opinion our sense could have in no way
done this without certain numbers latent in it. Or do you, perhaps, think a
great power like this belongs to some one of those four?
D.
On the contrary. I think this kind is to be distinguished from all of them. For
it is one thing to sound and this is attributed to a body; another to hear, and
in the body the soul is passive to this from sounds; another to produce numbers
either more slow or less so; another to remember them; and another by accepting
or rejecting, to give sentence on them all as if by some natural right.
M.
Come, now, tell me which of these five is the most excellent.
D.
The fifth, I think.
M.
You are right, for, unless it excelled, it could not bring judgment on them.
But again, I want to know of the other four which you judge the greatest.
D.
The kind in the memory, certainly. …
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