Showing posts with label decomposition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label decomposition. Show all posts

Monday, September 02, 2019

Is "everyone always stealing" black music? Wesley Morris' NYT 1619 project piece flips the script of the German Romantic ideal but still seems to play by it


I know there have been any number of conservative writers objecting to the New York Times 1619 project.  Highlighting the extent to which the slavery of blacks was a key element of American society should get detailed attention ... and yet ... there's a Wesley Morris piece that has me wondering whether or not the cliches of the Romantic era and the German idealist project haven't merely had the script flipped by American music journalists.   I'll take the liberty of quoting Morris at moderate length.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/music-black-culture-appropriation.html

For centuries, black music, forged in bondage, has been the sound of complete artistic freedom. No wonder everybody is always stealing it.

By Wesley Morris
AUG. 14, 2019
...

“White,” “Western,” “classical” music is the overarching basis for lots of American pop songs. Chromatic-chord harmony, clean timbre of voice and instrument: These are the ingredients for some of the hugely singable harmonies of the Beatles, the Eagles, Simon and Fleetwood Mac, something choral, “pure,” largely ungrained. Black music is a completely different story. It brims with call and response, layers of syncopation and this rougher element called “noise,” unique sounds that arise from the particular hue and timbre of an instrument [emphasis added] — Little Richard’s woos and knuckled keyboard zooms. The dusky heat of Miles Davis’s trumpeting. Patti LaBelle’s emotional police siren. DMX’s scorched-earth bark. The visceral stank of Etta James, Aretha Franklin, live-in-concert Whitney Houston and Prince on electric guitar.


But there’s something even more fundamental, too. My friend Delvyn Case, a musician who teaches at Wheaton College, explained in an email that improvisation is one of the most crucial elements in what we think of as black music: “The raising of individual creativity/expression to the highest place within the aesthetic world of a song.” Without improvisation, a listener is seduced into the composition of the song itself and not the distorting or deviating elements that noise creates. Particular to black American music is the architecture to create a means by which singers and musicians can be completely free, free in the only way that would have been possible on a plantation: through art, through music — music no one “composed” (because enslaved people were denied literacy), music born of feeling, of play, of exhaustion, of hope. [emphases added]

...

Chromatic chord harmony wouldn't be characteristic of all "white", "Western" or "classical" music.  Some styles of music eschew chromaticism and stick to largely modal diatonic scales.  I don't hear a lot of chromatic inflections or chromatic-chord harmony in the shape-note tradition, for instance.  Since I've been on a bit of a microtonal kick listening to music by Wyschnegradsky, Haba, and Johnston I can't say that "chromatic-chord harmony", if by that Morris meant music organized based on 12-tone chromatic half-steps has been all that typical of "western" or "classical" or "white" music until the equal-tempered tuning system was developed.  We don't have recordings of music as it was performed in the 17th and 18th centuries because, obviously, mechanical recording wasn't invented, so while we don't see any indications of microtonal inflections or adjustments to a seventeenth century Italian musical work doesn't mean it couldn't have happened.  That doesn't mean it did, necessarily, but I'm describing what I perceive as Morris' attempt to set up a duality between black and white music that I am not sure I can take as given. .


When it comes to ideas and ideals I've been pretty anti-Romantic my whole life.  I don't dislike German music as such, but I'm more of a fan of Schutz through Haydn than I am a fan of Beethoven through Brahms.  


Improvisation can be presented as a crucial element in black music but anyone who has studied European concert music from roughly 1600 to 1740 has probably run into figured bass continuo scores and realized that there's a lot Heinrich Schutz expected you to come up with from the skeletal score.  If you've ever tried reading medieval music scores you get to find out how very little is written down compared to 18th and 19th century repertoire.  I'm starting into a monograph by Angela Mariani on inventio and improvisation in medieval music and she sets out early in her book that there is a lot in performing medieval music that depends upon improvisation.  


Conversely, George Walker's scores are pretty lean, clean and clear.  His piano sonatas don't seem to call for improvisation but who on earth could say he was not a black American composer?  Joseph Bologne was an African-European composer who wrote out works that could have included some improvisation but as galant music specialists have been pointing out for a generation or so, improvisation was a key element in 18th century music.  Recently scholarly work reviving focus on the Italian partimento traditions of music pedagogy are shedding some light on ways in which improvisation was prevalent in music education for generations.  


Let me literally underline this for emphasis, the raising of the individual to the highest place within the aesthetic world of a song happens in "Western music" in the cult of the genius and in the singer-songwriter concept.  It's not that there aren't identifiable distinctions between African and European musical idioms, there surely are--the trouble is that Morris describes a number of things as being somehow essential to black music that exist in many styles of music across the entire planet.


Well, call and response is a pretty normal thing in human music across the world and it happened a lot in Renaissance vocal music.  What Morris seems to have done is to set up black American music as the music of freedom that, as the title indicates, is something that "everyone" steals.  But does "everyone"?  My concern about the NYT piece is that Morris seems so insular in defining music in American terms and in terms of an American narrative that there's not much about black music that he asserts as true that can't be found in other styles.  Does call and response music-making not exist outside of black music?  The entire polyphonic vocal tradition of Western Europe involves calls and responses, subjects and answers, cantus firmi and descants.  


The idea that plantation music wasn't "composed" because slaves were denied literacy is a category mistake.  Music can be composed in a lot of detail by people who are not literate.  In his books on early music in European traditions Bruce Haynes pointed out that many musicians who were musically literate enough to play in concert contexts may nevertheless have not been literate in the sense of being able to read books or contracts.  This doesn't mean they could not improvise music or compose out musical works.  Morris seems to be writing mainly about American popular music rather than about any other styles and it's understandable that popular music developed by African Americans represents a paradoxical musical freedom that emerged from those who were slaves or who were so low in socio-economic standing and legal rights no one would consider them "free".  


But couldn't that be said about Native Americans during the same centuries that African Americans were developing popular music?  Because Native American songs were tied with religious traditions that were frequently suppressed and because some tribes held their song traditions to be sacred and for initiates only Native American song may have had a number of obstacles to influencing American musical life that were not necessarily obstacles African American musicians may have faced in the same way.  Dale Cockrell's recent book Everybody's Doin' It charts the evolution of dance hall music as a popular range of musical styles connected to minstrelsy and also to the sex worker industries of New York, and Cockrell declares that New York's musical elite was searching in the wrong place for America's music, which was not in the symphony halls but in the concert saloons where men and women of every color danced and made music and had sex.   


Morris, too, demonstrates an awareness of this underclass wellspring of music-making across color lines. Yet Morris pauses a moment, considering the anti-racist aspect of America's grand history of racial mixing by way of popular music, and writes: ...


Sometimes all the inexorable mixing leaves me longing for something with roots that no one can rip all the way out. This is to say that when we’re talking about black music, we’re talking about horns, drums, keyboards and guitars doing the unthinkable together. We’re also talking about what the borrowers and collaborators don’t want to or can’t lift — centuries of weight, of atrocity we’ve never sufficiently worked through, the blackness you know is beyond theft because it’s too real, too rich, too heavy to steal.

...  This is the music of a people who have survived, who not only won't stop but also can’t be stopped. Music by a people whose major innovations — jazz, funk, hip-hop — have been about progress, about the future, about getting as far away from nostalgia as time will allow, music that’s thought deeply about the allure of outer space and robotics, music whose promise and possibility, whose rawness, humor and carnality call out to everybody — to other black people, to kids in working class England and middle-class Indonesia. If freedom's ringing, who on Earth wouldn't also want to rock the bell?


...

But couldn't this be construed as merely flipping the script of some post Johann Gottfried Herder style volksgeist?  Wanting a music that is too deep to be "stolen" or emulated sounds soulful and spiritual but it reminds me of Richard Wagner's screed about how Mendelssohn, being Jewish, could acquire all the slick technique to make passably competent music but could never have "soul".  I'm skeptical about the way "soul" gets used because I've seen that term used in just enough anti-semitic rants about Jewish music being soulless that I'm hesitant to endorse "soul", even when I have some idea of what is meant.

I understand that it is used with positive intent to describe music that leaves room for spontaneity and invention and is not technocratic ... but in that sense I could say the music of Ellington and J. S. Bach has "soul", the music of Toru Takemitsu has "soul", too.  There's some ... I don't know ... call it a golden mean mediating the extremes of writing-it-all-down and leaving-room-for-you.  Mileage varies on that.  I have no use for Elliot Carter or Milton Babbitt or Pierre Boulez because their music seems clinical and inhuman to me and yet I can think of a few people who revere the music of those composers.  If I read someone say that the music of Jacob Collier lacks "soul" I can even make a guess as to what is meant by that, and my version of that is to say that Collier has jaw-dropping technique that is not necessarily matched to a commensurate sense of interacting with the music of others, to invoke a Richard Taruskin style invective, Collier's style is a hothouse growth that comes across like the endpoint of a technocratic educational culture that can impart to eager students what they want to do but doesn't necessarily bring with that social connection through which music can find the extra-musical moorings needed to communicate beyond a restrictive niche.

But the trouble is that "soul" can often be a shorthand for ethnicity and as many whites looked askance on blacks being able to make music at the level of German masters, many whites regarded Native American songs as not even music or music of any value at all.  When Ida Halpern began her recordings of Pacific Northwest tribal songs it was partly because she'd invested in living with and working with the tribes for decades but also because the older men and women who knew the songs realized the younger men and women had no interest in the traditional songs and that if Dr. Halpern didn't record at least a few of them, the songs would die with the last generation that sung them.  So Halpern was given permission to undertake her recordings of music by the Nootka and other tribes in the Pacific Northwest.

Morris settles on a definition of black music that trades on the "authenticity" that would not be in any way out of place in a post-Herder conception of The Folk.  Wesley Morris may have flipped the script of the German Romantic artist-seer and ascribed those divine and inscrutable qualities to blacks on plantations but the core mythology and script is kept securely in place.  What if the evolution of American popular musical styles in dance halls, concert saloons, brothels, and red-light district hotels is not just explicable in terms of a flipped script from the legacy of German idealism?  What if American popular styles that evolved from minstrelsy and coon songs and marches and other lower class dance styles developed as part of a larger street level tradition of lampooning the highbrow art-as-religious-experience ideal?

In his 2018 book Making Light: Haydn, musical camp, and the long shadow of German idealism, Raymond Knapp made exactly this case.

Making Light: Haydn, musical camp, and the long shadow of German idealism

Raymond Knapp
Copyright (c) 2018 by Duke University Press
ISBN 9780822372400 (ebook)
ISBN 9780822369356 (hardcover)
ISBN 9780822369509 (paperback)


pages 217-218
German Idealism’s new paradigms for Music privileged musical experiences that involved quasi-ritualistic practices of contemplation, often communal and ceremonial but in any case accompanied by attitudes of reverence (e.g., concerts in established venues such as municipal concert halls). Music thus became experientially similar to religion, most specifically like Protestant Christianity. Like religion, it imposed a purifying conformity and seriousness at the same time that it promised access to an otherwise inaccessible and mystical realm. (127)  Moreover, music conceived in these terms became a political instrument, often associated not only with aspirational cultural values but also with establishing mainstream respectability as the basis for broad communality and, often, nationalist projects in which the relevant “people” are unified by a shared history and culture. Such is not an environment that might be happily embraced by marginalized groups, be they (specifically) working class, racially or ethnically “other,” or homosexual. There was thus quite a lot at stake for such groups, both in undermining this top-down way of organizing who belonged and who didn’t, and in furthering through theatrical representation and performance a more participatory basis for community, giving literal voice to the particularities of difference—even if often disparagingly and, in the case of minstrelsy with regard to blacks, also patently disenfranchising.

I'm going to interrupt this Knapp quote to highlight something I don't agree with.  Knapp describes the German Idealism paradigm as music being like attending a church service.  What I gather Knapp was attempting to say was that in German Idealism music in art music traditions came to be regarded as something so high and holy and so expressive of the inner being and soul of the Artist it gained a sacramental function, a literally sanctifying power.  To take in some German symphonic work of a master would be like taking Eucharist.  

Now I have seen some clear and earnest arguments that classical music concerts have to stop being like church services but ... let me put it this way, I grew up in Pentecostal churches and there is no way, no way at all, that the average Pentecostal church would resemble an Anglican service or a Catholic mass! 

The kind of music Pentecostals have had was so lowbrow and terrible to middlebrow and highbrow aesthetics that in his book discussing how rock and roll emerged from Pentecostalism Randall J. Stephens records that one observer of Pentecostal services remarked that the music resembled dance hall music and in light of books on dance hall culture from the 1880s through into the roaring Twenties we should not forget too quickly the dance hall scene was regarded as a front  by respectable society for racial mixing, drug dealing, prostitution and other forms of vice.  Pentecostal music would not, in sum, fit the paradigm of German Idealism Raymond Knapp likened to attending a Protestant church service.  

Elvis, Aretha, James Brown, Jerry Lee, Little Richard, and Ray Charles may have all been really bad, bad Pentecostals in terms of the holiness thing from the Holiness tradition but they helped pioneer early rock and soul music.  The possibility that the lowest of low brow musical styles associated with dance and prostitution couldn't be assimilated into the American musical mainstream without a little help from a purifying fire of a form of American Christianity that in its earliest years had an egalitarian streak in which women preached and color lines were ignored might be something for scholars to explore.  The rowdy low-brow music of dance halls and brothels was, as Dale Cockrell has put it, beneath the level of record--crime reports mentioned more music was loud, boisterous and not quite music than mentioned the music in ways that help us understand what it sounded like.  Yet to compare scholarship on dance hall musical culture to observations about Pentecostal musical idioms invites the possibility that the music of dance halls and brothels might not have mainstreamed into American popular culture without first having a bit of sanctification at the hands of Pentecostals who found ways to make the songs about something besides sex.  

Now, we'll get back to Knapp, who discusses how minstrelsy, despite its racism, could be seen as a powerful cultural current with an ethos and praxis set against German Idealism: 

Minstrelsy, notwithstanding its inherent racism, created a space of carnivalesque inversion to attract and entertain working-class audiences, involving marginalized populations (most often Irish Americans early on, and later African and Jewish Americans) who purported to depict an even more marginalized group (everyday African Americans). Minstrelsy’s music was often raucous and rhythmic, if sometimes sentimentally nostalgic, but always cutting against the grain of more serious, high-toned music. As well, minstrelsy mined a rich vein of humor grounded in the interplay of surfaces, taking the specific forms of masks (blackface), stereotyped personae, drag, and outrageous wordplay.

Camp, as it took form in theatrical cultures, became a mode of performance and appreciation that tore at the serious core of art (as espoused, for example, by musical idealism) and especially the high-art ideals of all-embracing unities (Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerken), by drawing attention to supposed inessentials and thus enacting an implicit metaphor for celebrating the margins. At the same time, camp established a coded means of communication through which those “in the know” might recognize each other, creating in-groups that early on might have included a variety of specific groups attracted to the theater, such as Jews and other urbanites, but came in the crucial middle decades of the twentieth century to consist mainly of closeted homosexual men.

...
The way Richard Taruskin described this kind of ideal was to talk about a Matthew Arnold style art religion, the kind of high and elevated art that, should people expose themselves to it, would elevate the good people to a still better spiritual plane.  The flip side was a belief that listening to the wrong kind of music would thrust people toward moral evil.

Taruskin's attack against this kind of art religion has two prongs.  The first is to highlight the ways in which the "low" music was often judged such because of who was making it and what the words in the songs, where applicable, seemed to be promoting rather more than on what was going on in the music itself.  This ties back to my suggestion above that it may have been historically necessary for the music of dance halls and brothels to get a foothold into American culture through a Pentecostalism that figuratively or literally sanctified the street level styles of the dance hall before they had a chance at making it "higher" in American society.

The second prong in Taruskin's attack is a more obvious one, advising us look at the Holocaust and ask why we should think that listening to Bach, Schubert and Beethoven elevates us.  This isn't because Bach, Schubert or Beethoven wrote bad music that we shouldn't listen to, it's that the beauty of their music has little observably to do with people being averse to mass murder.   Taruskin's admonition (and it's an admonition!) is that we should find other reasons to appreciate the beauties of art than appeals to its allegedly civilizing power.  As someone whose Native American father shared a bit about how Native Americans got treated by white guys who regarded themselves as civilized I admit to being pretty much completely sympathetic to Taruskin's polemic.

Which is why I find the ideal of authenticity hard to take seriously.  I take the idea of making music that can be regarded as well-crafted within an idiom seriously.

Then again ...  I am a Hindemith fan, and if there are composers who would be considered to have less "soul" by Americans than Hindemith I hesitate to guess who those could be!   I guess it might follow that a Hindemith fan cares about craft and creativity regardless of the elements of a particular style.  If musical mastery depends upon a craft, a craft that involves intellectual discipline and physical training and social interaction, then it is something that does not have to be beholden to some essentialist concept of a volksgeist, whether The Folk with the musical real deal are white or black.

But there is another ironic element about Knapp's observation about German Idealism and American popular music, something that has to do with the King of Ragtime.  When Edward A. Berlin has reported in his biography of Scott Joplin that when Joplin heard a Wagner opera he expressed admiration for the work and clearly aspired to write both opera (Treemonisha) and a piano concerto, which has been lost.  Joplin wanted his work to be taken seriously as art and Stark certainly marketed Joplin's works as being worthy enough to be played alongside Chopin and I agree with Stark!  It's taken a century, basically, but Scott Joplin's piano works have made it into the classical canon and become part of the foundation of jazz and just about any American music I would consider worth talking about!

But we can have more than just Joplin's music, or the ragtime masters, and I think we should.  Florence Price wrote concert music which is now getting a hearing again. Someone should take the time to record her string quartets, pretty please.  Will that happen?  Well ... in a way that gets me to what Morris' piece has gotten me wondering about.

One of the problems with a mythology of black raw authenticity in underclass music is that while there's a lot of beauty to that music flipping the script of the German idealist project makes it less likely that black composers who aspired to "serious music" will be heard in the way they should and the irony of this potential predicament is that pop music advocates who set up an artificial opposition between highbrow and lowbrow in which "black" is authentic compared to a white highbrow tradition may have an incentive to just never get around to learning that composers who were or are Afro-American (George Walker), Afro-Cuban (Leo Brouwer, a personal favorite and a remarkable guitarist composer), or Afro-European (Samuel Coleridge-Taylor, for instance) exist and have published works.  Would a Wesley Morris regard any of these composers as writing music that would be "black" or "black enough"?  Of course we're discussing black composers but the question that isn't even latent in Morris' working definition of blackness is whether any of these black composers have written work that fits Morris' working definition of musical blackness.  I regard Brouwer as a brilliant composer, one of my favorite living composers.  I also like what I've heard from George Walker.  I'm still digging into Price.  Coleridge-Taylor, I think, is probably too beholden to Charles Stanford era post-Romantic music to ever catch on in the United States and his music has been dubbed "not black enough", which would be a shame because which version of "black enough" are we talking about for those who would say this about his music?

This is where Raymond Knapp's work comes to mind.  As Knapp put it in his preface:

xii-xiii

...
1. US American popular music grew up primarily in theatrical contexts, including minstrelsy, variety, and operetta, all of which largely opposed the strictures of an emergent “classical music” culture that was based in German Idealism. 

2. These origins and their significance for the emergence of popular music in the twentieth century have not been joined well by popular-music scholarship; indeed, advocacy for twentieth-century popular music seems most often based on rationales borrowed from the very musical culture its forebears had rebelled against.


3. Camp—a hallmark of popular musical theater—has been particularly ill served by popular music’s advocates. While this may be due in part to camp’s association with gay subcultures, it probably stems more fundamentally from camp’s fascination with the artificial, the contrived, and the theatrical—preoccupations anathematic to the cult of authenticity that has taken over popular music studies.


4. Camp itself has not been properly understood within historical contexts, perhaps because of a widespread insistence on understanding it as essentially gay, even though that association took hold relatively late and has been steadily eroded since Susan Sontag’s “Notes on Camp” in 1964.


In other words, the German Idealist standards of authenticity and soul were at work in jazz and rock criticism in American 20th century advocacy.  The script was flipped from the Artist-Prophet being some "pale male and stale" symphonist as Guardian contributors like to put it to the black musician playing a juke joint and singing the blues ... but Knapp's contention is that the underlying script is actually the same.  The irony of this script flip, Knapp argues, is that it flies in the face of what he regarded as the aims and interests of the musicians who developed the popular styles of American music that explicitly rejected the German Idealist legacy both in terms of the dance idioms and theater music of popular song and the bawdy lyrics.

Knapp's book delves at some length into minstrelsy and camp, since the subject is making a long-form case that Haydn's music is so steeped in camp it cannot be squared with the German idealist ethos and praxis that dominated classical music and held sway in American music educational programs.  I don't take seriously the idea that Mozart or Beethoven are actually the least bit more "profound" than Haydn because Romantic era journalists and composers decided that they were.  Haydn was popular enough to inspire the foundation of a Handel and Haydn Society in America.  Joseph Bologne, an African-French musician, is recorded as having played a role in Haydn's Paris Symphonies getting into the world.

American journalists can talk about the need to revisit the history of slavery and blacks and the beautiful musical traditions developed and refined by blacks in America ... but as I get older and consider my own mixed lineage of Native American and white parents, and also consider my basically lifelong objections to the ideologies that evolved during Romanticism, my concern is that if all we Americans do is flip the script of the German idealist mythology of authentic and true artistry we'll be enslaved to that mythology through the ways we try to rebel against it.  My concern is that what Wesley Morris has done is basically just flip the script when what I believe we should do is reject that script.  As I've been trying to put it, I've been an anti-Romantic pretty much my whole life.  Maybe that makes me more sensitive to noticing when advocates of black American popular music make Coltrane or Prince the new Beethoven or Mozart in how they talk about the music they love.  You can love all of those musicians as far as I am concerned.  Despite the differences I had with Andrew Durkin about what kind of "authenticity" he tried to take on in Decomposition, I think that taking down the idea of "authenticity" is necessary--but the problem is that if I take Wesley Morris as a guide for how American journalists write about American popular music the German Idealist standard of authenticity is as alive and well in popular music journalism as it was in nineteenth century advocacy for Beethoven.

The flipped script can manifest in Guardian pieces that lament the "pale, male and stale" symphony and ask that we get more women and composers of color.  Now I am absolutely all for someone recording the Florence Price string quartets instead of yet another Schubert or Mozart cycle!  Bring it on!  It's just that one of the risks I see in music advocacy is this Romantic script, merely flipped, being the way we still talk about music.  Loving as I do the music of Haydn and Stevie Wonder I believe there has to be some other way to express admiration for these musicians than trafficking in the myths of the Romantic era. I love listening to John Lee Hooker and I love listening to the organ music of Buxtehude.  If I could decree that a composer's works for double bass and guitar could become a canon for study I would declare Annette Kruisbrink's duets for double bass and guitar should be the foundation on which double bass and guitar chamber music should be built.  Had to throw in a good word for her music while I was at it.  There is not, alas, a box set with all of George Walker's piano sonatas on it but I would highly recommend his piano sonatas and I'd like to say a brief word of thanks to Ethan Iverson for blogging about Walker's work, which is how I learned about him.

So ... when I read Morris write:

Sometimes all the inexorable mixing leaves me longing for something with roots that no one can rip all the way out. This is to say that when we’re talking about black music, we’re talking about horns, drums, keyboards and guitars doing the unthinkable together.  ...

I don't see what the problem with mixing could be.   A mixed race marriage is how I came into the world.  I am very much in favor of mixing in terms of musical styles and ethnicities.  I'm not even exactly very progressive as such.  Pentecostals have never been known for being exactly "progressive" in the way that New York progressives might think of the term.  Cosmopolitanism may only ever develop in imperial contexts but, if you'll bear with the flamboyant assertion, Catholicism and Anglicanism nailed the imperial context before American deists got around to formulating the First Amendment.

This is another element latent in Morris' writing that isn't on the surface, but the global reach of American popular music can't really be separated from American imperial presence.  Is it altogether good that middle-class people in Singapore can listen to blues?  Black American popular music doesn't have to represent freedom even to Americans just because an American journalist says it does.  My friend who grew up in Nagasaki found blues boring because it was so formulaic and predictable and took time to warm up to any jazz.  There are powerful extra-musical narratives and mythologies woven into our cultural reception of music.  What has happened is that "raw" and "authentic" have been terms applied to black American popular music as part of a journalistic and scholarly and marketing effort to sell music.  The music is, so very often, wonderful.  That doesn't mean it can't be the music of an empire.

When Ian Pace discussed Anglo-American popular music he didn't shy away from having a discussion about how while it's a rich musical tradition with a lot to it he likes but that it is in many respects the most hegemonic musical idiom on the planet.  My own conviction has been that we can't get rid of canons but we can work diligently to make sure all of these high and low and middle brow canons are able to benefit from synergistic interaction and the best way to attempt to do that is to drop the pretenses and master narratives and mythologies of authenticity that are built up around pet styles.  Meanwhile, we "could" accept black American popular music as the music of freedom if a Wesley Morris says so but does the music of Beyonce or Jay Z or Kanye West actually represent freedom?  Why?

Now it's one thing to want to preserve traditions we regard as beautiful that developed in particular ethnic contexts.  It's another thing to melt down myriad music traditions and practice into a binary of "white" or "black".  Michael Jackson had a song about how it didn't matter if you're black or white.  We .. know that there are some significant issues about Michael Jackson ... and yet part of the appeal of his songs is a hope, a hope that at some point in the future these color lines through which so many people mediate their ideas of authenticity and legitimacy won't have to be as stringent as they are. And there is, after all, more than just American black music out there.  There's Ethiopian and Kenyan and Sudanese and South African music (and some of that South African music is made by people who are white.

Even the idea of "white music" as deployed in American music journalism can seem dubious to me.  After hearing French music, German music, Polish music, Serbian music, Croatian music, English music, Irish music, Welsh music, Greek music, Italian music, Finnish music, Estonian music, Russian music, Ukrainian music and ... what am I supposed to believe all of these musical traditions have in common that makes them "white" beyond just the obvious matter of skin?  When American journalists talk about "white" music or "classical" music they are probably talking about duple meter music that sounds German or English, not about Bulgarian guitar music that switches back and forth between 5/8 and 7/8 at a breakneck tempo or Polish or Bohemian music in 5/4.  My concern, as I read journalists attempt to discuss music, is that all too often they fall back on stereotypes about generic "white" and "black" music in ways that I no longer believe are accurate descriptions of the panoply of beautiful musical idioms and traditions across all ethnicities.

Doing battle against an evil and toxic mythology perpetuated by white American racists who held to a fragmentary and historically dubious concept of "whiteness" by just flipping the script of the German Idealist checklist of authentic, raw and "real" music does not seem to me to be a path forward because developing a nostalgic narrative in which black music broke all the rules of proprietary by daring to imagine the never-done-before is inspiring to some but for me, this anti-Romantic sort just sees the same crap that I saw being promulgated by the likes of a Berlioz or a Romantic era advocate of "follow your muse and don't bother with the petty rules."  As best as I can tell sonata form wasn't made into a rigid script for how to write a first movement for a symphony until the Romantic generation came along.

As Kyle Gann has put it, eighteenth century music could get a lot weirder than you were probably ever led to believe in an introductory music survey class.  The Anton Reicha fugue in 5/8 in A major where the subject answers at E flat, sweet.  :)  As Leonard B. Meyer suggested, Reicha may have been attempting to assimilate Bohemian folk music into concert music traditions but it wasn't the normal way to approach notating music at the time, whereas in a post-Bartok era this has become more common.  That gets me to another concern, the history of Western art music traditions should warn us that it can take generations, maybe even a century or two, before what Richard Taruskin called the Western literate tradition adds a musical practice into an on-the-page form.

A good deal of music journalism I've seen arguing that we need to stop being pale, male and stale is making what I regard as a constructive criticism of the legacy of German Idealism and the more oppressive aspects of nineteenth century music pedagogy and canon formation ... but the part I disagree with is when music journalists whose background is mainly in more popular styles seem to unwittingly collapse the entire thousand year history of Western musical idioms into a one-size-fits-all German symphonic idiom.  Yeah, there's that, too, and I love a lot of Haydn symphonies ... but it's still a stereotype.  Ideally the goal in any given direction should be to help remove those stereotypes, whether it's a stereotype about German or Austrian symphonies or hip hop or country pieces all being cookie cutter identikit products that lack "soul" because an advocate for one or another says so from an academic position.  Every Robert Johnson blues song sounds the same to the uninitiated in more or less the same way that every Haydn symphony is going to sound kind of the same to the uninitiated.  Music education can, ideally, disabuse the ignorant of both of these misconceptions.

Now, finally, when we're talking about music involving horns, drums, keyboards and guitars doing the unthinkable together ... for Morris it is black American music ... but it could be Edgar Varese or Iannis Xenakis ... only if we refuse to interpret the word "unthinkable" in anything close to a literal way.  There are versions of the guitar across the world, the guitar as a concept, but the most famous guitars were developed in Spain and Russia by way of the six and seven stringed instruments respectively.  If the unthinkable is anything besides hyperbole then the unthinkable will be stuff we've never heard and won't hear because, of course, it's unthinkable.  Truly unthinkable music will never be thought up, let alone played.

To get at what Morris might really mean, I'm reminded of Elaine Sisman commenting on Beethoven's approach to variation technique.  Beethoven did not really "break the rules" of technique.  His counterpoint was solid counterpoint, his embellishments were all of a piece with what composers could do and did do.  What Beethoven was breaching, Sisman wrote in her monograph on Haydn and variation technique, was the proprieties associated with variation technique.  He might introduce violent, dark contrapuntal variation techniques into the first variation in a variation movement, which would in his day have been saved for a climactic or late-stage variation in a variation form.  This is probably closer to what music writers mean by the "unthinkable" and the thing is that that kind of "unthinkable" is virtually standard in a world as big as we have.

For a brilliant musician there's a craft to things.  Long ago I once shared with someone that if you understand the aim of a rule you can break the letter of the rule in order to observe its intent.  Something like that happens in the more capable musicians, a demonstration that part of craft is learning which aspects of a craft help you say what you want to say and which ones, once you understand that those other elements of a craft won't help you say what you want to say, can be dispensed with.  When Stevie Wonder has a neo-galant string quartet backing him up on "Village Ghetto Land" the disconnect between "high" and "low" in terms of extra-musical associations is one of the keys to appreciating the wit and acid observations of the song.  This did not, by any means, mean that Stevie Wonder didn't have any affection for classical music.  He sang Schubert's "Ave Marie", after all.

Had Stevie Wonder decided to do what would be called a "raw" and "rough" blues ballad "Village Ghetto Land" would probably still have been a pretty good song.  I don't exactly embrace the idea that Art has to be done in such a way where it could only be "this" and not something else.  The genius of what Wonder did with his neo-galant setting of "Village Ghetto Land" is he says "Would you like to come with me, down my dead end street ... " in a musical context that tells you that, no, whoever the "you" is that he's addressing in the song is never going to go with him down to Village Ghetto Land ... but that doesn't mean the speaker in Wonder's song can't tell that "you" about the place.  That the "you" Wonder's speaker is speaking to is not the "you" who is you or me listening to the song is part of the craft of the song.

Ironically, perhaps, a quote that comes to mind about the mythologies of authenticity presented by advocates for generic conceptions of "white" and "black" music is from a writer with whom I often ardently disagree.  When he's wrong he's spectacularly wrong but when he is right (in the "a broken clock can still be right twice a day" way) he is, probably, very right.

Perhaps that art alone would be authentic that would be liberated from the idea of authenticity itself, of being thus and not otherwise.
Theodore Adorno, Philosophy of New Music
...
It's a terrible shame he couldn't follow his own advice on that axiom in relationship to music made by black Americans.  Adorno's Marxist commitment precluded him from recognizing that there could be craft and artistry even in what he regarded as trashy popular song.  Sure, a lot of popular songs are identikit mass-produced products ... but even Adorno could notice that an awful lot of what he regarded as low quality serious music had the same problem.

My conviction over the last twenty years has been that the "high" and "low" have atrophied into formulas because practitioners of musical styles have gotten into ruts, ruts that would seem easy to escape if they restored a synergistic interaction of styles guided by deliberate decision-making; I don't mean all the folks who in some kind of New York music scene are described as "beyond genre". A contemporary Adorno might sniff, with cause, that the kinds of people who say their music is beyond genre might not have any demonstrable mastery of any of the styles and genres they claim their music is beyond.

What my ideal is, as I trust I've implied by so many words about Stevie Wonder, is a level of musical craft in which you can take or leave elements of a style or idiom for expressive purposes because you have mastered enough of those styles to mix and match.  You can't do that if you regard one of them as more authentic than another and this is not a point about pluralism at some ideological level of the sort that conservatives and traditionalists go on about, it's about something more central to the life of a practical musician, what Paul Hindemith used to call craft.  Or as my composition instructor used to tell me, "You can break as many of the "rules" as you want as long as you know what they are and why you're breaking them. That's what I can help you learn." Since he knew I enjoyed some of Mondrian's work he pointed out that Mondrian's later work meant what it did because he had the craft to do other things.  That is what a music education can help you gain.

Someone like Stevie Wonder can write "Superstition" and perform "Ave Maria" and play those brilliant contrapuntal harmonic solos on "Too High" by mastering a variety of styles.  There's a type of plurality of mastery of style that we can find in the seventeenth through eighteenth centuries that may ... drop off a bit in the wake of the Romantic generation as certain elements of craft came to be regarded as too fussy and fusty.  There's nothing fussy or fusty about a fugue if you remember that the heart of such writing is in the tunes.  In principle I think a composer should be able to take a bass line from something like an Aretha Franklin or Stevie Wonder or Ray Charles song and develop a fugue or invention out of that.  It's a hold over from the ideological notions of the Romantic era and what Leonard B. Meyer described as its focus on organicism to claim that there are "inherent" tendencies to the material, or inherent possibilities.  That, I think, depends on craft.  I might find that a theme I wanted to use in a set of variations might sound bad as a variation movement and then I might discover that if I reconceive the work as a sonata form that suddenly things "click" and I can finish the piece.  Something that might not make sense for me as a sonata may work well as a rondo.  I might find an idea that works well as a sonata theme can also work as a fugue subject but if I don't have the craft and knowledge from which to make these decisions I'm stuck.

I've come to a conviction that music education is valuable and yet also misrepresented, particularly as relates to style.  I don't think people cannot be taught styles.  People can be taught jazz and blues and country and all of the lowbrow vernacular styles that supposedly don't follow the rules of classical music.  What people cannot be taught is what decisions to make and this was Adorno's damning assessment of integral serialism and aleatoric music, that both styles amounted to techniques that absolved their users of ever having to make artistic decisions.  I discussed that at some length in "
Between forms of non-choice" a while back, and discussed how Adorno's criticism of the technocratic tendencies inherent in twelve-tone technique could be cross-referenced to Jacques Ellul's criticism of art in technocratic societies.

To put all of that in an old-fashioned Romantic sort of way, the question is whether you master technique or whether technique masters you. The Romantics, I suppose, urged everyone toward the former rather than the latter but the mythologies surrounding the Artist-Hero that have accrued over the centuries and the emergence of technocratic art in technocratic societies of the kind that Adorno and Ellul condemned may suggest to some of us, at least, that the Romantic ideology of authenticity and legitimacy have shifted dangerously in the direction of the mythologies superceding aspects of craft--the way I see the Romantic era of music will not be everyone's cup of tea but I regard Romantic era pedagogy as creating a double bind that music and music education would benefit from finally shaking off, both in terms of concepts of formal analysis and craft and also in terms of what I consider its more pernicious legacy, ideas and ideals of authenticity and legitimacy in art that are, as many a progressive writer has pointed out, too implicitly anchored to colonial legacies.

When I read Wesley Morris' piece there was stuff I admired about the sweeping survey of how popular music performed by black musicians came to gain acceptance and popularity and respect in American history ... but there's a lot in there that as vestigially Romantic ideology that I recognize and reject.  As I've been saying, if all we do is flip the script of the Romantic era German Idealist concept of Art we're still tied to that script.


POSTSCRIPT 9-28-2019

Noticed there was some problems with blogger not letting me shift font colors to delineate quotes and discussion.  So I've been working on refining that, with mixed results.  

Sunday, August 30, 2015

Andrew Durkin's self-defeating manifesto

Durkin read the review of Decomposition here at Wenatchee The Hatchet and left a few comments. 
So firstly, thanks for coming by and commenting.  It's been great to have the blog have comments that aren't about the usual set of topics the blog's gotten a reputation for.  It's also especially fun for the blog to spark any interaction about music instead of ... the usual set of topics.

It probably comes as no surprise to Durkin that we come from different perspectives.  He's mentioned not having the desire to engage in a lengthy interaction, which is fine.  Whether or not Durkin read all the posts tagged with "decomposition" is less clear.  However, he shared a few things in comments that have cleared up a couple of things about his book, cleared some things up in a way that makes it easier to understand why I have come to consider his entire enterprise to be sententious and self-defeating.

We can quote a few sentences from the start and end of his comments that may suffice to distill his philosophical approach.

http://wenatcheethehatchet.blogspot.com/2015/08/andrew-durkins-decomposition-neither.html?showComment=1440482629673#c8386557877724633888
Here’s what I think you’re missing in much of your review: I don’t believe concepts can exist outside of the ways we write or speak about them.
http://wenatcheethehatchet.blogspot.com/2015/08/andrew-durkins-decomposition-neither.html?showComment=1440482997060#c8942929480356653382
Sorry, but I don’t believe in artistic greatness. I believe that all we can do is love the art we love.

...
It seems necessary to clarify what I began to have doubts about regarding Durkin's book.  He can subscribe to the idea that concepts don't exist outside the ways we write or speak about them but I'm coming more from the side of playing with the idea that how we even think about music is circumscribed by the linguistic parameters through which we learned about music or literature.  We can be hamstrung by what we are or aren't able to think through based on the language through which we learn to think about music.  Which may be a tolerable transition to questions raised about Durkin's engagement with the secondary literature known as musicology.

Durkin did mention having not read a couple of the Meyer books I mentioned. For those not eager to read the length of his comments, he mentioned what books he read and what ideas he referenced.  As mentioned before, I agree with Madison Heying that Durkin seems to have not read widely or deeply enough in musicology to have made some of the points he tried making.  I'd go a step further and suggest that Durkin wasn't widely or deeply read enough in the last 41-80 years of musicology to have made some of his points.

Durkin is more than free to insist that concepts don't exist apart from the ways we write and speak about them.  The strength of his arguments in Decomposition may not derive the force of argument from a premise like that.  If anything, a philosophical premise like that highlights that his book would have benefited from formal and analytic musicology.

When I wrote earlier that if Durkin was going to take aim at demythologizing touchstones in the Western canon he needed to show he knew his work, Durkin may have taken that as a sign he needed to write his book.

Well, the problem in the Ellington/Beethoven dyad earlier in Durkin's book is that Durkin clearly demonstrates direct familiarity with Ellington's music and writings about Ellington's music. Then we get to Beethoven and Durkin shifts to summarizing DeNora on what other people said about Beethoven.  By the time I finished reading Durkin's book everything Durkin said seemed like stuff that could be written by someone who had consulted a wide variety of the secondary literature .. without having bothered to study or play a single piece by Beethoven.  Or listen to one, for that matter. It's not just that I and others have doubted the depth and breadth of Durkin's readings on musicology, I've come in the last year of considering the arguments and content of the book to have some actual doubts that Durkin even knows the classical repertoire of Beethoven or Bach.

Take the chapter where Durkin talked about "The Riff".  It's shooting fish in a barrel to explore how Russian folk songs got worked into Beethoven's string quartets for Russian patrons. It's easily known by anyone who's immersed themselves in the Goldberg variations that a Polish folk song got worked into the Quodlibet.  For that matter, for people already familiar with the music, it's not even that difficult to draw a line from the 9th century Pentecost chant Veni Creator Spiritus through to Lutheran hymnody for Pentecost to the subject of the fugue in Bach's C major violin sonata.  Had Durkin done for Beethoven (or Bach) what he'd done with Ellington, discussing where the riffs came from and how a composer or arranger can use a variety of riffs, not all of which the composer originated, and create vital and interesting music, he could have drawn a historic path from the 9th century to the 18th century to show how the remixing kept going on across nearly a millennia.  That is, if Andrew Durkin were actually familiar at any level with the concert literature of "so-called classical music".

Musicology and formal analysis is precisely the body of literature in which scholars of music point out that Matiegka appropriated the fast finale of a B minor piano sonata by Haydn to become the first movement of a solo guitar sonata.  It's how Kyle Gann can explore that Mozart made use of materials he'd heard from Clementi.

Durkin had plenty of time both in his book and in comments to explore and explain the lineage of what he calls decomposition across the classical canon.  He never really did that in his book and over at his blog Ugly Rug, eleven years worth of blogging has not revealed any particular familiarity with Beethoven's work, or Bach's.  This doesn't mean Durkin doesn't know the music, but eleven years of blogging and a published book is plenty of time to demonstrate a working knowledge of the classical side of things.  A person could invoke the B natural debate about Beethoven's Hammerklavier without so much as having heard the piece.  Reading the secondary literature gets that knowledge taken care of. 

So Decomposition comes off as a book written by someone who has written about what other people have written and said about people like Beethoven without revealing at any point any direct familiarity with Beethoven's work.  If Durkin wanted to show that Beethoven got ideas from folk music he could have.  If Durkin wanted to highlight the insoluable debate of preference over which ending for the Op. 130 string quartet is the preferable one of the two authentically composed-by-Beethoven endings, he could have done that. 

Classical music has a centuries old pattern of composers appropriating the ideas of other people, saying whose idea it was, and running with it.  Martin Luther would adapt Gregorian chants into vernacular hymns. Bach would employ isometric adaptations of sixteen century hymns shifted from their modal form into a major/minor key system. Haydn could take Polish folk songs and work them into the trios of his string quartets.  Matiegka wrote a set of variations on a lieder by Haydn in his Grand Sonata II. Brahms wrote a set of variations on a theme by Haydn (or Handel or Paganini).  Ferdinand Rebay adapted a variation form composed by Brahms into a slow movement in one of his sonatas for solo guitar.  From century to century musicology is able to demonstrate in historical terms what Durkin has described as "decomposition", and yet when it comes to the classical side of his point-making Durkin not only seems to come up short on the secondary literature, he actually at times makes it hard to know if he even knows the primary literature.

Let's take the Ellington/Beethoven dyad again.   Demythologizing Beethoven is shooting fish in a barrel for anyone who knows the primary works.  The problem is that Beethoven's not necessarily the best case study as a contrast to Ellington.  Durkin is bothered at the mythologizing tendencies of language about the singular genius and the authentic instantiation of a musical work. Durkin could have consulted Richard Taruskin's tree-killing two-volume survey of the armies of folk tunes Stravinsky appropriated for his work and how Stravinsky made a career of self-mythologizing.  What makes the mythologizing tendencies in the "lone genius" and the "authentic" part of music-making pernicious is that the people most apt to deploy this language are the creative people themselves. Of course since we live in an era of popular culture that is practically excluded from the public domain people will feel it's dangerous to admit artistic debts in pop music.  The funny thing here is that in classical music these debts are admitted so readily and casually it could have been a case where if Durkin knew any of the classical music warhorses and the lineage of the works he could suggest that the different eras of music have unique things to share. 

Durkin tends to focus on the ways that copyright regimes create problems (and those are considerable in a number of ways) but Durkin read Teachout's biography of Ellington and so Durkin could have highlighted that creativity can involve working AROUND restrictions, the way Ellington urged his son Mercer and Billy Strayhorn to create reams of music during the BMI embargo of ASCAP members.  Ellington was part of ASCAP, if memory serves, and found himself in a sticky spot when it came to composing music.  But his son and Strayhorn could work within and around those restrictions and this was an integral element of the prodigious output of the Blanton-Webster period. Duke would suggest chord progressions and then encourage Mercer and Strayhorn to develop the rest.

I think that a contrast between Ellington and Stravinsky would be more instructive because both composers occupied the same century of creative activity and in both cases myth-making vs reality has become easy to document. As it stands, Durkin may or may not have any familiarity with Taruskin's fantastic survey that demythologized Stravinsky for Stravinsky. We have plenty of documentation by now how, as I put it in an earlier post, even the most apparently solitary artistic person is creating art in a way that is fundamentally a social activity.

If Durkin had the musicological background and interest demonstrating how riffs get reshaped across a millennium of musical activity would be pretty easy to do.  It could have demonstrated the potential vitality and applicability of "decomposition". As it is, "decomposition" is more apt to become Durkin's "that is so fetch".

Now Durkin's certainly able to insist that concepts don't exist apart from the ways we write or speak about them.  This is a point at which Durkin might have benefited from reading some of the work done by social scientists and biologists on heuristics, cognitive development and the like. What if, for instance, concepts are not "just" in verbal or oral expression but are circumscribed by the language(s) we learn from childhood?  It may be true that a concept doesn't exist apart from what you write or say but before you can say or write a sentence thoughts are in your head. Does a concept only take shape once it is written or spoken, or can a concept be formulated by a thinking and perceiving mind before it is articulated?

To give an example, babies don't have the language with which to communicate conceptually but just because a baby doesn't have a mastery of a language yet does that mean the baby is incapable of formulating a concept that we adults could describe as "I'm hungry"? Is the baby not hungry because it can't speak words saying "I'm hungry" or write anything?  Now maybe a person hearing the baby crying might have to rely on other sensory perception than hearing (like a sense of smell) to determine that maybe that baby isn't hungry but has had a diaper blow out. The question at hand is whether the baby somehow doesn't have a concept of being hungry or having a diaper blow out for lack of linguistic categories to express the concept or, to some degree, even perceive what hunger is.  Does hunger not exist for the baby because he or she or it lacks a linguistic framework in the mind from which to identify the sensation we tend to call hunger?

It's possible that the language in which we think circumscribes the range of concepts we can write or talk about, just as it's possible that concepts don't exist apart from the way we write or speak about them.  This would suggest that, if anything, Durkin would have a reason to immerse himself deeply and broadly in musicology and formal analysis.  Yet as Heying has noted, Durkin's attitude toward musicology and formal analysis seems to be dismissive.  If so that's a shame because if concepts don't exist apart from the way they are dealt with in language via writing and speaking then this would elevate the significance of formal analysis because, in that sense, there might be no music apart from the reified expression of music in a fixed form.  If there is a "music of my mind" that can exist independent of formal expression then Durkin has devoted chunks of his book to doubting the legitimacy of the ad hoc languages and lexicons developed over millennia to talk about and get to performing music for reasons that are never particularly clear. 

And in the long run it's difficult to tell whether or not in the end Andrew Durkin has much interest in defending the ideas in his book in connection to his eleven years of blogging, too.  In a comment Durkin mentioned the following:

http://wenatcheethehatchet.blogspot.com/2015/08/andrew-durkins-decomposition-neither.html?showComment=1440482997060#c8942929480356653382
Sorry, but I don’t believe in artistic greatness. I believe that all we can do is love the art we love.

This sententious assertion needs to be read alongside what Durkin's blogged over the last eleven years which includes a fairly standard issue bromide such as ...
http://uglyrug.blogspot.com/2014/01/a-meandering-post-on-collaboration.html
...  I don’t need to be convinced of Ellington’s greatness; I already know his music saved my life. ...

This gets to the self-defeating core of Durkin's approach.  Durkin insists that all we can do is love the art we love, having cast doubt on the legitimacy and utility of linguistic categories we humans have used  since 19 ... always to express such love, while using such hyperbolic language in his own expression of love for the music he loves. 

POSTSCRIPT

In the history of humans certain quests and claims keep coming up.  The opportunity Durkin had for a manifesto (or the start of one) would be to propose that the boundaries across the styles we so often think are distinct are ultimately permeable.  The music you love may have more in common with the music you think you hate than you might first realize.  I thought I didn't and couldn't like any country in my teens and then I began to listen to country and learned that the boundaries between jazz and blues (which I did like) and country (which I thought I didn't like) were more permeable than I had imagined them to be. I read interviews with Bob Dylan where he said to not just listen to him but to listen to who inspired him and to listen to who inspired them. So I went back to Robert Johnson and went back to Ellington and Mahalia Jackson. Then I went back to Scott Joplin and learned he was familiar with Beethoven, Brahms and Bach. So I got into Beethoven, Brahms and Bach and learned they were respectively inspired by Haydn and Telemann and Schutz and Buxtehude.  I kept going further back and stopped around Leonin and Perotin and Ockeghem.  Also got around to music from China and Thailand and Japan along the way.

Durkin focuses on what he seems to think negatives to reification. There are, however, positives. The beauty of an age in which music is reified is that we have an opportunity to understand how permeable the boundaries across musical styles and forms are.  Where Durkin seems obsessed with the limitations of notational systems and certainties about whatever a "master" version is, that's all inconsequential to me.  Rather than lament reification what if we take it as a given and see what is possible in light of that reification.  One opportunity is to take a computational approach to the recurrence of riffs across multiple styles in different eras. There's no reason a person can't hybridize the invertible contrapuntal idiom of the 18th century with the blues vocabulary of American blues players.  To borrow a bit from Yoda, no, is not different, only different in your mind. If we're to have music beyond category we may not enjoy formal analysis at first but the beauty of formal analysis is that it can, despite its drudgery, lead us to discover how permeable the boundaries are between early Romantic 19th century guitar sonatas in Spain and ragtime in the early 20th century.

http://uglyrug.blogspot.com/2015/03/on-suit.html
...
My friends complain about modern pop all the time. I wish I could evaluate it in aesthetic terms. But I feel like I can’t even hear it. It sounds like money to me. I hear the money that went into the production. I hear the money that went into the promotion. I hear the money that is being exchanged every time it is performed. I hear the money that is expected as a kind of birthright. Lord help me, I cant get past the money. 

I dislike contemporary Christian music because when I hear it I feel like I'm looking at a grainy black and white photocopy of a postage stamp reproduction of a Thomas Kinkaid painting.  But if Durkin's going to take his critique of authorship and authenticity seriously he'd have to say that there's no argument that this is inauthentic music or that it's bad based on any question of authorship.  Dismantling the ideologies of authenticity and authorship should have led Durkin to a point where he should be able to celebrate at least some modern pop music regardless of the money issue.

It's not enough to question the viability of "authenticity" and "authorship" as ways of praising the music we love, it's far more important to dismantle them as categories through which we vent about music we hate.  It's when Durkin complains that he can't hear modern pop music as music that he reveals maybe he can't even completely commit to the ideals he has tried to formulate in his own manifesto.  And if he can't go that distance himself, should the rest of us bother to follow?

Saturday, August 15, 2015

Andrew Durkin's Decomposition--neither a philosophy of music nor a manifesto, but a potential conversation starter for those who slog through it

http://knopfdoubleday.com/book/237102/decomposition/
http://www.musicandliterature.org/reviews/2015/1/5/andrew-durkins-decomposition-a-music-manifesto

I kinda wanted to like this book but it's not really a manifesto because a manifesto would get straight to the point, actually say something, and say something in a simple way.

But it's not a philosophy of music either, or even at all.  So neither of the working titles seem accurate.  Then again, publishers can make decisions so it seems unfair to try to judge a book by its failure to live up to either published title.  The term "decomposition" is still there and it gets something like a definition.

There are some core ideas in this book I could totally endorse without reservation if those had been the ideas Durkin had spent the majority of his book actually dealing with.  Instead the book takes aim at the ideologies (Durkin's term) of authenticity and authorship. Durkin tries to show how dicey these two ideologies are without being successful.  The reason he's not successful is that he is attacking these concepts as ways of writing about music rather than attacking the legitimacy fo the concepts as a whole.  And the trouble is that even if he had attacked the legitimacy of the concepts of authorship and authenticity as concepts he could have just had everybody read Andrew Potter's The Authenticity Hoax, which directly attacked the notion of authenticity across the board since the dawn of the Romantic era. 

And in any case attacking authorship and authenticity would not do a single thing to change the proliferation lof Taylor Swift songs or One Direction songs or all country songs sounding vaguely the same.  Leonard Meyer pointed out half a century ago that products of art have been team-built products.  Durkin's half a century late to the party if he wanted to point out that authorship is a myth because much of what passes for solitary invention is really more like a social process. 

Earlier reviews have suggested Durkin could have engaged more of the musicology writing in the last thirty years.  Actually, having read the book, I've come to think the problem is Durkin could have been more thorough in absorbing Leonard Meyer's writings.  It seems particularly unfortunate Durkin's writing about the problems of authenticity and authorship being problems that he doesn't seem to have read Style & Music: Theory, History and Ideology, in which Leonard B. Meyer explicitly and at length deals with ideology as an engine for concepts about originality and authorship from the end of the high Classic period through the end of the Romantic era.

Nor has Durkin's reading seemed to include Meyer's impressive 1967 book Music, the Arts, and Ideas, in which Meyer predicted the emergence of a stable steady-state of polystylistic options across the arts. Meyer also noted that the products of artistic activity in the 20th century were more collaborative and committee-based. 

Let's get to a few particular bits in Durkin's book.  Durkin's attack on authorship features some ruminations on the collaborative nature of Duke Ellington's compositional approach.  That got discussed at some length in Terry Teachout's biography Duke from a few years ago. It's fun but not necessarily a meaningful counter to an ideology of authorship since not many people celebrate Ellington's music as a brand.  We still think of it as Duke's music. 

When Durkin later turns to Beethoven he doesn't really say anything much more than that Beethoven's popularity coincided with a shift in European taste in which instrumental music became popular and symbolic of European high art aspirations.  The trouble is that Durkin never even starts to address how or why that ideological/aesthetic change took place and this was precisely what Leonard B. Meyer discussed at length in Style & Music!  As nationalistic impulses began to emerge in the 19th century there was a push to get away from what was believed to be too international and cosmopolitan a style in music toward the roots music of cultures.  But, as Meyer put it, even though divorcing music from the constraints of language could ensure music evoked the "universal" of feeling and intuition nobody could easily devise a new musical syntax to replace the forms of the 18th century, whether the Baroque forms or the forms of the Classic era.  So Romantic composers spent a century finding ways to disguise their reliance on the conventions of the eras they were trying to distance themselves from.

But Durkin's book never starts moving in that direction. What he does instead is take aim at the uncertainties and exigencies of notational systems, which is altogether a waste of time.  Once again going back to things written about half a century ago, Paul Hindemith remarked that the Western notational system has plenty of problems and a composer can only use it to convey to a performer an approximation of what the composer has in mind. Meyer, in Music, the Arts, and Ideas mentioned that (forget exactly where now) one of the things a written notation system permits for music is the development of complex forms.  In Durkin's conclusion he makes a plea for complexity in music, not for the sake of complexity but for music being, well, anyway ... the irony of Durkin's attacks on authorship and authenticity by going after notational systems is that Meyer pointed out that without notational systems human musical activity is tethered to what people can remember long enough to continuously perform and when we're anchored to the limits of human cognitive bandwith to THAT degree humanity has proven time and again that we stop short at about the three minute mark.  Paging Taylor Swift again ... .

If Durkin stays committed to attacking notational systems as a case against the ideologies of authorship and authenticity he might find that he's making an argument against the slippery and often inadequate systems that, nonetheless, have permitted the complexity he'd like to hear more of. 

All that said, reading Durkin's book was a gateway to listening to some interesting stuff, like Conlon Nancarrow's player-piano studies. Where Durkin had a chance to formulate a real manifesto could have been in this material, where he details that no matter how solitary a genius people might want to think Nancarrow was his creative process was still essentially collaborative.  It's a shame Durkin relies on what seems to be ad hoc and idiosyncratic jargon.  It's also a shame he doesn't seem to have cast his net wide enough to show that as ideologies go, an insistence on the "right" edition of the perfect score is relatively new.  Sure, he gets to Bach editions and how accepted performance practice informed that but that's not quite what needed to be articulated.  No, the fact that Mozart and Haydn, or even later composers, were happy to revise and rewrite their works to suit the needs and strengths of their musicians at hand could have bolstered Durkin's arguments for what he calls contextual and direct collaboration.

Actually, it's a shame Durkin didn't use the most obvious case for a collaborative process in Beethoven available, the Diabelli variations.  Diabelli tends to get dismissed as a mediocre composer and not without some cause, but Diabelli's Op. 29 guitar sonatas have their merits.  If you could hear a Marcin Dylla playing the F major you'd hear that at his best Diabelli had some promising material.  It took a Beethoven to coax that greatness from the music since Diabelli, whatever his gifts, left some ideas under-developed but that's some blog post for some other time.  Durkin's not a guitarist and is a jazz musician rather than somebody who composes chamber music so I'm trying to not be unfair here when I say that Durkin needed to strengthen his readings on Beethoven a little more before he wrote a chapter that purported to demythologize the lone genius narrative of Beethoven without actually doing so.  It didn't have to be a door-stopping double-tome like Taruskin's treatise on Stravinsky's appropriation of Russian folk music, but if Durkin wants to take aim at the biggest names in the concert music canon he needed to brush up on the critical literature a bit more.

However, Durkin's proposal, if I can dare to distill it into an actual axiom for a manifesto goes something like this:

* All artistic activity, no matter how physically isolated, is invariably a social activity
* All artistic activity, as an act of communication either aspires toward or must risk cliché
* Therefore originality and alleged social authenticity must be viewed with some skepticism

Had Durkin read more widely in Meyer he could have benefited from Meyer's axiomatic observation that the ideological insistence of the Romantics on individual expression created a paradox, the problem is that individual expression and artistic individuation paradoxically depends upon the norms that are supposed to be contravened for the sake of individuality.  Style as an indicator individuality got abandoned by those Meyer called empiricists and transcendentalists (like John Cage) and so in the 20th century there were artists moving away from the idea that the aim of art was to be an expression of the artist's self. 

Quaintly enough, some of those 20th century composers in some sense returned to an 18th century doctrine of affect.  Meyer described the distinction as being one in which the 18th century doctrine of affect proposed that music represented emotional states while 19th century ideology claimed that music expressed the feelings of the individual artist who created the work.  I think the 18th century formulation makes more sense.  You can work to represent an emotional state in a musical work as a matter of convention, understanding that not everyone will perceive the music in the same way, whereas the Romantic variation can come across pretty quickly as narcissistic solipsism

Oh, have I forgotten to mention I actually don't like a majority of Romantic era music?  :) 

Durkin's attempts to cast doubt on whether we all hear the same music, this is not an organized review so much as a year's rumination, is also frustrating.  Durkin spent 300 some pages to get at a point that Paul Hindemith knocked out swiftly in the first 40 pages of A Composer's World: Horizons and Limitations.  That really was half a century ago, give or take a year, and Hindemith wrote that what happens when we listen to music is a form of parallel mental construction in which we compare what we're hearing to what we think is going on in the musical work.  Hindemith credits this idea as going as far back as Saint Augustine, and Hindemith stated that one performance of a musical work could elicit a different response from each member of the audience because each member of the audience will mentally comprehend and interpret the music in different ways. 

Durkin's attempt to question authenticity and authorship based on asking "do you hear what I hear?" is a self-defeating notion because even a thoroughly conservative and traditionalist type like Paul Hindemith pointed out decades ago that, yeah, we all mentally interact with what we hear.  If we're hearing music based on a musical syntax and vocabulary we don't understand, however, we WON'T HEAR IT AS MUSIC.  John Cage's innovation was to introduce the possibility that once you perceive music as a mental process or disposition toward hearing music in the sounds around you then human agency in music can be altogether removed.  Questions of the authenticity of the composer or performer on the one hand or the centrality of the author as a Romantic ideological talking point vanish. 

But that's not the only movement within the arts to get in the direction of questioning Romantic ideological insistence on innovation, personal expression and all that.  When Stravinsky insisted that music was powerless to express anything beyond itself this can be construed as a reaction to Romantic ideology, which freighted music with so much necessity to express the soul of the artist and be emotionally and culturally "authentic" it was overwrought.  Stravinsky famously jumped from style to style and appropriated ideas and methods from a variety of musical eras.  You could suggest that Stravinsky tilted back away from a Romantic ideology of art-as-expression-of-the-artist's-true-self toward something more like an 18th century doctrine of affects in which music can abstractly depict a series of emotional states or concepts within a shared understanding, but that the artist as artist has no inherent claim to dictating what the language may mean.

Durkin's attack on what he calls the ideologies of authorship and authenticity ring hollow because while he takes many and generally ineffectual labors to attack the concepts as rhetorical devices within writing about music he never even begins to attack the legitimacy of the concepts as a way to understand the arts, or even his own approach to the arts.

If he had cast about beyond music his ideas and questions could have been fascinating.

Let's take film, what is the "real" version of Star Wars?  Hasn't Lucas spent decades insisting that everyone who enjoyed the 1977 version of Star Wars fixated on an unfinished movie? Well Herman Melville insisted Moby Dick was a draft of a draft and it's still classic American literature whether you enjoyed it or not. That there's a "de-specialized" version of Star Wars out there suggests that within cinema history audiences can be persuaded that the director/screenwriter's authority has limits.  Once you put something out there as a completed/released work of art the audience interaction with that work takes on a life of its own.  Durkin's blog shows he's clearly familiar with all the ways in which Lucas got ideas from other places. 

Maybe Durkin's even read The Secret History of Star Wars, too. If Durkin wanted to get at a case study in which ideological insistence on authenticity and authorship is potentially toxic and flies in the face of audience affection it would be impossible to find a better case study than George Lucas! The more we have at hand to learn about how the films developed the more thoroughly it becomes clear that the films were a sprawling collaborative process yet if there's any self-aggrandizing solipsistic myth-making process in the contemporary arts about the arts, George Lucas' decades of "I meant to do that" tinkering with films he made decades ago could have been exhibit A for Durkin's best points about the shortcomings of a straitjacketed ideological insistence on a certain understanding of what authorship and authenticity are.

But we keep mythologizing anyway.  It doesn't matter how many Beatles there were, we pick the individuals who are allegedly most responsible for the final product.  Why we keep gravitating toward individuals as emblematic of collaborative processes is almost too obvious to mention.  As Daniel Kahneman has put it, our brains are organisms designed to jump to conclusions.  Most of the time that works.  In fact 90% of the time it works just great which is why when the 10% shows up where that doesn't work great it's a disaster of cognitive shortcuts.

If Durkin had written his whole book around a critique of contemporary copyright practice then it would have been an entirely different (and probably better) book.  Durkin points out that there's a big difference between urging that copyright needs reform and the two binary positions of "copyright is evil" and "copyright as it is is great".  Alas, this is the part of the book that seems tacked on and incomplete.  Nothing about, say, a supreme court case in which publishers wanted to reject the right of first sale!? 

The concept of "proprietary totalism" as the default position of corporations is an interesting one, one that could be fleshed out more.  I would suggest, since, you know, this blog tends to get known as that blog covering the life and times of Mars Hill Church and Mark Driscoll as a public figure, that Durkin's writing invites a question.  Let's consider that "Blurred Lines" case and by contrast consider that in the midst of a year or two of controversy about whether or not Mark Driscoll was a plagiarist not a single author or publisher opted to take legal action.  Was this really because there was no evidence in the first print editions for plagiarism?  Well, no, that's not likely because as Warren Throckmorton documented, Driscoll's publishers retroactively fixed many a passage by adding footnotes and attribution that had not previously existed in first print editions.  So THAT would seem like evidence that authors and publishers "could" have made a case for plagiarism.  Nobody did, whereas Marvin Gaye's estate did sue after they were sued, if memory serves. 

Durkin has proposed that technology informs how we understand the arts.  Arguably our reliance on machines to both create and hear music has done more to inform our cultural insistence on authenticity and authorship than traditional musical notation. Our expectation that a musical piece sound the same every time isn't a "universal" but it's an expectation that can be reinforced by the ways that we listen.  Sousa warned that by letting our musical experience be mediated by machines this would introduce a brutal stratification between producers and consumers of music; it would lead to a proliferation of music via machine that would obliterate regional musical dialect and flavor; it would lead to a culture in which the amateur musician all but vanished and the need for music teachers and the infrastructure of cultural preservation would be harmed. 

Now the funny thing here is that about half a century later the émigré Paul Hindemith complained that American musical culture, particularly in music education, had this idiot egalitarian streak that bore no resemblance to the real world. Tell every kid that he or she could be a future Beethoven and you're lying to the kid but American aspirational ideals, as Hindemith perceived them, ran with the idea that you tell a kid to reach for the sky and assume the best.  He sourly asserted that all the American musical educational system seemed to be good for was not producing balanced all-around musicians but music teachers who would produce more music teachers and specialists who would produce more specialists.  Not unlike Sousa, Hindemith believed the role of the amateur musician in fomenting musical culture was a necessity.

And in a way one of the boons of the technology that may have divorced the production of artistic work from any monetizable way of profiting from it could be the emergence of a new amateur class.  But I wonder if this is the part that Durkin and others may not have considered in classic left/progressive terms.  Let's get back to "Masscult and Midcult" and old Left attacks on the middlebrow.  If the middle class is shrinking does the middlebrow go away?  No, the corporate funding can jump in and save the day.  But that's not what is interesting here, the question that comes up is if the old Left talked about high art and low art, about high culture and folk art, what could we say describes those two realms?  High art had the patronage system but folk art, what was that?  Couldn't we get quasi-Marxist here and suggest that folk art was made at the time and expense of the common person without any necessary expectation or reality of financial compensation? 

A life in the arts if you're not in an aristocratic leisure class might be a life in the arts where you do it entirely at your own expense with no actual pay just because you love making music or art or whatever your hobby is.  If Durkin wanted to really attack the ideologies of authenticity and authorship he could have attacked the legitimacy of the ideological insistence on the superiority of the vocational artist over the hobbyist.  He could have done this, too, by way of Charles Ives.  Durkin's working definitions of authorship and authenticity were too narrow and so he ended up stopping short of getting into some stuff that could have been fascinating. 

Decomposition doesn't read like either a manifesto or a philosophy of music. It reads like a series of dead ends on tertiary issues that don't seem important to what Durkin's worried about in his book and at his blog.  It reads like a series of false starts and rabbit trails into things that don't address the real ideological stuff going on behind the buzzwords he spent a few hundred pages trying to neutralize to no effect.

Still, fumbling attempts to address how we think about the arts is better than not thinking about how we think about the arts.  I doubt Durkin would agree with Sousa about the dangers of ceding so much of our musical life to machines from a century ago.  I don't know that he'd even agree with Leonard B Meyer's warning in the 1990s that the danger in our listening is how inattentive and partially focused it is now that it's mediated by machines through which we listen to music while we walk to the grocery store instead of listening in the devoted setting of a concert or a recital.  Really, I do think Durkin could have benefited in writing his book from being more deeply engaged with Meyer's work beyond the book with "emotions" in the title.  I also, obviously, think Durkin could have benefited from spending less time attacking the straw man of the vagaries of music notation and more time on the ideologies behind his ideologies of authenticity and authorship.

Meyer wrote that the problem of value is inescapable.  We can pretend it doesn't matter, we can bury the debates about value in technical jargon, we can find ways around it but we can't escape the question of what we value and why in the arts.  In some sense Durkin's ultimate failure is that he tries to dismantle the ways we talk about values without questioning the values themselves.  He's not really interested in attacking authorship or authenticity as customs of history or even as ideologies, but as buzzwords he perceives in music journalism.  But the problem is that if we're not talking about music in the aesthetic and technical terms of the construction process what do we have?  We will tend to fall back on to the lifestyle reporting Ted Gioia complained about.  But the Scylla to Charybdys here is that classical music writing became irrelevant, as Richard Taruskin has put it, for being obsessively into shoptalk, talking about the technicalities of the construction process without getting around to what these things mean.

Leonard Meyer wrote in his Music & Style that it is impossible to assess a work of art on its own terms.  Our very capacity to recognize something as a work of art is culturally and ideologically mediated.  The paradoxes of Romanticism are that the individuality it prized depended on the norms the individual was expected to subvert.  Meyer described Romanticism as the ideology of elite egalitarians.  The egalitarian impulse was strong in Romanticism but the trouble is that all art as communication depends on the kinds of conventions the ideology repudiated on the one hand, and on the other hand the capacity to deviate from norms depended on a knowledge base that generally ended up being elitist.  It was ultimately impossible to repudiate the syntax and vocabulary of the 18th century for the 19th century composers.  By the 20th century the norms had been abandoned to degrees that tested the limit of human cognitive bandwidth and let's just say we don't all listen to Schoenberg in the elevator ... .

Which is to say that Durkin can attack authenticity as much as he wants but the problem is that in lieu of explicitly formal/formalist values in assessing what music is and whether we call it "good", the default definition for artistic greatness becomes ... authenticity.  Thus old debates about whether whites could really play jazz or whether black composers could contribute to classical music in the same way as whites have because it's music of the Man or something kind of like that.  Paul Desmond was a great saxophonist and George Walker has written some fine piano sonatas, so there.  That gets to my misgivings about Durkin's project, he doesn't want to affirm aesthetic criteria through which authenticity based on ethnic or class signifiers define participation in the arts, and I think I totally get the reasons he doesn't want to "go there".  But the trouble is that if we don't go "there" and we don't turn to the proposal that there are aesthetic values we can construe as aspirational absolutes then we're kind of at a burger joint saying we don't want to buy a bacon cheeseburger but the place doesn't sell chicken.