Showing posts with label Ellul on the arts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ellul on the arts. Show all posts

Saturday, August 29, 2026

Alan Jacobs on bad arguments for the liberal arts that defend the funding of jobs and departments rather than the liberal arts themselves

https://blog.ayjay.org/bad-humanists/

N. Ángel Pinillos asks, Why Are Humanists So Bad at Defending the Humanities? — and his answer is that humanists’ defenses of the humanities fail when they argue that the humanities have any kind of intrinsic, as opposed to instrumental, value. Now, Pinillos says that he happens to believe in the intrinsic value of the humanities, but people outside the humanistic disciplines don’t, so the intrinsic-value argument, “deployed as a public argument, has lost us the public. …

Pinillos seems to think that this case has “been ignored,” though for half-a-century I have been reading essays about how a humanities education makes you a better citizen. He also says straightforwardly that we professional humanists “teach a set of skills that you cannot get anywhere else,” which seems to me … well, I started to say that it seems to me a debatable proposition but in fact I think it is demonstrably false. I know many people who can do all the things Pinillos lists in the paragraph quoted above who have never taken so much as one course in the humanities. 

He says that his essay is a defense of the humanities, when in fact it is an argument that universities should continue to fund humanities departments — because of their instrumental value. [emphasis added] If you could show that students can learn to read contracts and evaluate communications from doctors without the help of courses in the humanities, then nothing would remain [emphasis original] of his defense of “the humanities.” 

 

I say, in reply, that (a) the humanities are not to be conflated with courses in universities that bear the “humanities” designation, and therefore that (b) Pinillos has not defended the humanities at all, but instead has simply pleaded that university administrators and boards of trustees allow people like us to keep our jobs. [emphasis added]

Maybe Frank Zappa would say it’s like the advertising representatives and talent scouts saying that they are the people who need to keep their jobs in the music industry because if you don’t have them you don’t have the music industry.  The musicians?  Well, uh, anyway, never mind them for the moment. 


I can't help but be reminded of Jacques Ellul riffing on the role art critics came to play in technocratic societies, blogged about here and here.  Ellul observed that the arts critic has only been with us a few centuries, the implication obviously being that the super-majority of the history of human artistic activity has never required arts critics or arts departments for productive activity. At a more rudimentary level Theodor Adorno kicked off Aesthetic Theory with the observation that now that art had been liberated from service to throne and altar it was free, yes, but it has been stuck in an intractable crisis of purpose and legitimacy from which it can't possibly escape. Ellul, for his part, said that Adorno correctly grasped the state of the arts presented the Scylla and Charybdis bind, art either serves a state or is a hermetic technocratic cult that has no appeal to outsiders. 

I previously mused upon the idea that without a gatekeeping element to their role an arts critic is a super-consumer in a world of consumers.  The crises presented by AI-generated arts are crises for educators and gatekeepers before they are crises for consumers. Last summer I wrote "Why the priests of Art Religion can't accept an AI-generated offering on its altar: remainder humanism; AI-generated music; and a figural reading of Levitical rites on the question of whether The Velvet Sundown is even a real band"  An academic can talk to students about whether something is a duck or a rabbit. I have been suspecting in the last year that the crisis of AI-generated art is that it replicates at a massive scale the lies promulgated about the arts from within academic traditions.  To put this another way, if humans can be trained to create duck-rabbit drawings and taught how to interpret the same image as a duck or a rabbit and to toggle back and forth between them, the threat of AI may be that the AI slop people worry about has to be programmed to present just the duck or just the rabbit.  In chains of ones and zeroes there's not room for a 0.005, a 0.2341 or a 0.66666 is a way to put it, but those fuzzy and fudged cases are where art happens, to put it in a purely and slickly bromide way. 

Saturday, March 21, 2026

threading together riffs from Freddie deBoer, Ted Gioia, Alan Jacobs on the crisis of AI slop being the crisis of educational formulas about the arts in Cold War American arts education programs

Freddie deBoer's recent post (Great Writers "Tell" All the Time) rolls out a few usual suspects (Jane Austen, Fyodor Dostoevsky) to demonstrate that the "show don't tell" bromide has been one of the more harmful pedagogical cliches of what Mark McGurl describe in his book The Program Era (not that deBoer name-checks that book anywhere in the post).  The other axioms are "write what you know" and "find your voice".  

I mention deBoer simply in passing despite his inspiring this post because I have also been reading Alan Jacobs and Ted Gioia on artificial intelligence and how it has been used in the arts.  Jacobs was the one who proposed that AI slop has become what it was because the Iowa Writers Workshop formulas made it so easy for Ai to replicate those formulas.  I discussed that over here.

Ted Gioia has been warning that AI slop is utterly inhuman and even if I can agree on paper I think the grand failure of Ted Gioia has been the failure to explain how and why AI slop is what it is.  How is it that the AI project, which has been utterly human from start to finish, become abruptly inhuman only at the content generated from the AI prompt?  As Ethan Hein so eloquently put it, AI slop predates AI.

deBoer's proposal is that rules that make sense for screenwriting and playwriting migrated into prose where "show don't tell" is not automatically (or even usually) the wisest way to write.  It is here that I can't resist shifting to an essay Leonard Meyer wrote in the last century wherein he contended that one of the foundational mistakes of the integral serialists was presuming that all levels of cognitive engagement worked in the same way with music.  Meyer's counterproposal was that just as a molecule doesn't behave the way a cell does; a cell doesn't behave the way an organ does; an organ doesn't behave the same way a system does; and a biological system is not the same thing as organism in a similar way the behavior or patterns of musical organization at the level of the phrase are not the same as those for a larger musical chunk.  As Ben Johnston put it in the writings that made it into Maximum Clarity, twelve-tone exhausted its own set of viable options faster than all tonal systems that came before it.  

AI has been creating creepy slop because we taught it a bunch of lies about what good art does, if not necessarily about what we consider good art.  I respectfully differ from Bryan Townsend that AI slop generates cliches.  Love is the biggest cliche there is but we need love.  We also can't all be super-Benthamites who abjure all the arts.  

Engaging all the arts on the basis of a few simple top-down formulas has been what we've had going on in the arts in the United States for generations.  It's one thing to lament the identikit nature of post Joseph Campbell Star Wars everywhere monomythic monotony.  That's to complain about the output.  The problem with the input filter is that Joseph Campbell's whole approach was garbage.  It doesn't necessarily improve if the variation comes via Northrop Frye.  These moves have probably had the same effect on narrative as Anton Reicha's description of grand binary form had on early 19th century piano sonatas, leading to a bunch of interchangeable and forgettable piano sonatas from that period nobody knows about because those sonatas were written by people who didn't end up getting canonized. Ethan Hein is utterly write that AI slop predates AI but I am willing to grant that Reicha did not intend for his description of what has come to be called sonata form as a mere formula or recipe. 

Ted Gioia claimed in his history of music that through the power of music we can all be wizards.  That's a lie.  I've made this point in the past but the big theme running across Peter Beagle's novel The Last Unicorn is the contrast between the magic of seeming and the magic of doing. The magic of seeming can seem powerful and amazing but it creates appearances and impressions for those who are able to be won over by it.  The magic of doing is a lot more powerful but also more difficult to control and fewer people have the ability to master that kind of magic.  It can be read very easily as a parable about two kinds of art.  As big and scary as The Red Bull is he's blind and, as the magician points out in the story's end, the monster conquers but never fights.  When the unicorn turns, stands her ground and prepares to fight The Red Bull he relents and the unicorns trapped in the sea are released.  The old king Haggard meets his death with a strange sense of relief as the bull he'd captured is leaving him.

King Haggard's domain can be read in the early twenty-first century as a kingdom of AI slop with a king who wants to see, if just once in his life, someone who has the magic of doing and not the magic of seeming.  Beagle, tellingly, once described himself as not seeing the king as a villain because he saw himself in the character.  A particularly acid literary scholarly sort could quip that The Last Unicorn is literature in the magic of seeming and not doing a la whoever-else-that's-been-canonized gets assigned to you in a college literature course. But the academic world of liberal arts education has to have been administered by a bunch of King Haggards for AI slop to be what it is here in 2026.  

Apropos of nothing I'm reading James Crenshaw's book on Ecclesiastes.  Crenshaw takes the book to have been a fabrication passed off as the work of Solomon so there are ideas Crenshaw entertains I find less and more persuasive but an idea of interest to me is this--Crenshaw pointed out that in the wisdom literature of the Hebrew Bible there is no redeemer.  Job hopes, briefly, that he can have a redeemer who delivers him from his misery but Qoholet does not conceive of God as a redeemer and the Book of Proverbs gives you rules to live by because people who don't screw up their own lives have done at least that much.  The Wisdom Books are books with no memory of the Exodus and even no recollections of the Law, let alone the Prophets.  

The proverbial is wise but also formulaic and yet we have generations of liberal arts educators who swear up and down in theory and practice that the liberal arts are supposed to be prophetic and powerful and shake things up and call down and call up chthonic spirits blah blah blah.  But what gets taught is literally proverbial and formulaic.  The problem isn't that proverbs are cliches.  Cliches are often true and even often wise but Proverbs warns that a fool wielding a proverb is still a fool.  Proverbs also warns that if you see a man who is wise in his own estimation there is more hope for a fool than for him.  Qoholet warned that even if a wise man claims to have figured everything out that happens under the sun don't believe him. 

In his commentary on Job 1-21 C L Seow noted that many biblical scholars have groused that Elihu seems to add nothing to the debate.  That's obviously not true.  Seow pointed out that Elihu's new contribution is that God reveals some things to some and not others and that this is so is mysterious.  Job's friends rely on what may be good theology as far as it goes but the shoe-horn Job's suffering into their established ideas and double down on the necessity of being right.  

The crisis of AI slop in the arts seems to me as though it's art generated by Job's friends rather than Job.  It's the art that relies on the wise formulas of tenured sages that has no prophetic element because ... when's the last time you heard of a North American tenured academic who thinks prophets are actually prophets and not scribes with political interests whose hegemonic agendas can be deconstructed from the strictures of language and analyzed with respect to systems of control?  

We live in such a time that people can publish books in which they not only assume Q was a real document but that the political agendas of the scribal community that produced Q (upon which the Synoptic Gospels are assumed to have relied) can be nailed down.  Look, I get that Q is useful as a scholarly shorthand in New Testament studies for all the material in common across the Synoptic Gospels.  That doesn't oblige me to think some Q document ever actually existed--that's a scholarly super-fad of the last century or so.  Let's think of AI slop in the arts as what you can get if you think the Gospel of Q was ever actually written and not the fabrication of American scholars who think they're smarter than the people who wrote the Gospels. Their scholarly magic can be described as a magic of seeming and not doing. It's the committee made reductionist take on what some self-selected scholars decide the "real" teachings of Jesus were once all the mythic stuff got removed.  

And Ted Gioia can wonder how AI slop got to us?  No, I think it's pretty patently clear what kind of technocratic self-assured American educational norms helped get us to the age of AI slop.

In postmodern biblical studies we can see that people have realized that you can speculate on the subdivisions of J, E, D and P all you want but that will not get you closer to interpreting the actual Torah as a narrative.  If you spend your time separating P and E materials and don't actually read the narrative of Genesis 9 and wonder whether Noah's curse was simply unjust then you're splitting hairs within the realms of academic fads rather than directly wrestling with how unjust Noah's curse is within the Genesis narrative if you stop and think it over.   I am not kidding about scholars being so busy separating strands of the Genesis narrative into source critical ruminations they don't deal with the narrative but I'll let Justin Michael Reed's book do the work he already did in it.

You can take that tale of source critical hair-splitting that doesn't engage the narrative itself as a parable and a tale of how we arrived at AI slop. The mystery is not that we got here to the point where AI slop art is with us in a new form, it's that people who taught the way they taught the arts for the better part of a century, devoted to what Jacques Ellul described as the dogma of technique, didn't step back to think that this outcome was on the way. 

Saturday, December 21, 2024

Rick Beato has a video on "The Death of Music Genres" which reminds me that as the loss of mono-genre dominance goes Leonard Meyer called it back in 1967 with classical music

The Death of Music Genres

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-h_OHhtvPU

 

As Kyle Gann put it, back in 1967 when Leonard Meyer published a book proposing the death of any single genre in music being the norm (in classical music) it was greeted with controversy.   Gann quoted Meyer saying the following:

I should like to suggest - and, considering the rapidity and frequency with which styles have followed one another in recent years, the suggestion will probably seem a rash one - that the coming epoch (if, indeed, we are not already in it) will be a period of stylistic stasis, a period characterized not by the linear, cumulative development of a single fundamental style, but by the coexistence of a multiplicity of quite different styles in a fluctuating and dynamic steady-state.

That was in 1967.  Gann noted a bit dryly that while this was a revolutionary suggestion that the “present” of music indicated a post-genre “future” academic musicology did not get together and hail Meyer’s idea as prescient or accurate.  Gann said that what actually happened was stuff like playing Handel on 200-year-old woodwinds and looking at Fanny Mendelssohn and looking at the influence of minstrelsy on Broadway musicals.  In other words, academics stuck to their ruts and lanes and did not think through the implications of every style and form of music the world over being able to exist simultaneously in a potentially synergistic poly-stylistic steady-state.

 

https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo3629352.html

Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth-Century Culture

Leonard B. Meyer

ISBN: 9780226521435

ISBN: 9780226521442

ISBN: 9780226521442

 

But suppose the paradigm which posits cumulative change and the discovery of a common style is no longer pertinent and viable? Perhaps none of the "revolutions" will be definitive; then astonishment would disappear. Suppose, too, that there are no "imperatives" of the sort that Boulez assumes (Whose imperatives? What is "our time" but the totality of actions, including art works, that take place in it?), and, consequently, that no style is necessarily superfluous. Suppose, in short, that the present pluralism of coexisting styles (each with its particular premises and even its attendant ideology) represents not an anomalous, transient state of affairs, but a relatively stable and enduring one.

 

I am suggesting not only that such a hypothesis is neither theoretically absurd no empirically impossible but that, once it is adopted, seemingly incompatible pieces of the puzzling present begins to form an intelligible pattern. If our time appears to be one of "crisis," it does so largely because we have misunderstood the present situation and its possible consequences. Because a past paradigm has led us to expect a monolithic, all-encompassing style, the cultural situation has seemed bizarre and perplexing. The "crisis" dissolves when the possibility of a continuing stylistic coexistence is recognized and the delights of diversity are admitted. The question then becomes not is this style going to be THE STYLE, but is this particular work well-made, challenging, and enjoyable.    pages 171-172

 

Kyle Gann has elsewhere noted (back in 2007) that it seemed after the mid-1980s the collective academic narrative stalled. Whereas composers and musicologists were holding forth on what was probably going to happen or “ought” to happen in the horizons of music by the 1990s and early 2000s there was not much of anything by way of sweeping histories or manifestoes.

https://www.kylegann.com/PC070425-NarrativeInterrupted.html

 

Okay, maybe, but Richard Taruskin’s Oxford History of Western Music was (and is) pretty sweeping. Of course it began as a funereal observance that mutated into a more chastened observation that classical music isn’t dying, just changing.

 

Rick Beato’s video lingers in my mind as a rock (though not necessarily rockist) variation on an observation about the “death” of genre Leonard Meyer observed in what’s colloquially called classical music back in 1967.

 

Bryan Townsend had some thoughts about Beato’s recent video and, among other things, wrote “I think it is better that we develop our own musical taste rather than have it curated for us.”  Sure, but as I hear Beato’s thoughts I think he’s coming at this more from the angle of exposure and not the angle of curation.  As William Deresiewicz put it in The Death of the Artist: How Creators Are Struggling to Survive in the Age of Billionaires and Big Tech it’s easier than ever to get published and harder and harder to get monetized for publication.  In yet another nod to the notion that artists are the prophet-priest-seer-king-moral-legislators of civilization we got an account of how part of the crisis in the humanities is that the writers and poets and artists who could tell us like it is and help us be those cussed individuals upon which free societies rely can’t make ends meet enough to keep doing what they do.

 

Part of me was sympathetic and part of me was curious enough to pick up Excellent Sheep but a big part of me thinks “Well, cry me a river.”  Larry Shiner has pointed out that the whole notion of fine arts as defined in art history is a recent innovation and invention that can’t even square with how the arts were actually practiced in, say, the Renaissance.  If the Artist as imagined since the Romantic era wasn’t even how Leonardo worked with other artists then the “death” of such an artist maybe isn’t as catastrophic or significant as vocational arts scholars and literary theorists make it out to be.  Sure, someone like Norman Lebrecht has been bewailing the death of criticism but Jacques Ellul pointed out in The Empire of Non-Sense that most of human history rolled along just fine with no arts critics to serve as brokers for patrons.  Who were the critics at newspapers who made Bach and Haydn and Mozart that musical touchstones they became in chamber music?  Well, hey, if autonomous art transcends constraints and all who needs to cheer for new music?  The good stuff will be found out and we could just gut music education and patronage systems and just trust all the hard-working musicians will just somehow get heard, right?

 

The reductio ad absurdum speaks for itself, and yet the death of genre hardly seems like it is necessarily a problem.  My own conviction has been that if there has been a death of genre over the last century in pop music there has been a diffusion of “focus” in classical music, too.  The simultaneous co-existence of every style and form is hardly a problem.  Richard Taruskin made a passing comment in The Ox about how back in the 18th century there were tons of musical forms and styles and genres and yet nobody thought of the Baroque era as a rat’s nest of musical incoherence because every genre and form and style existed within and for a clearly socially articulated social use.

 

Social use, you say?  Isn’t that reducing art to mere servitude?  Adorno contended in Aesthetic Theory that the “liberation” of art from theology and from service to throne and altar created a crisis of purpose from which and to which “art” has zero answers.  Jacques Ellul, for his part, wrote that Adorno correctly grasp the aporia of modern arts, that they are either reduced to being propaganda on behalf of a state or cultural norm on the one hand or devolving into hermetically isolated technocratic experimentation for its own sake that can only ever appeal to insular coteries on the other.  “Pop”, however we define it, has always been music created in the sausage factory for writers like Adorno.  But Adorno created a double bind in which tonality was “used up” but pop music had no capacity for large-scale forms and yet the large-scale forms that had been the domain of “classical music” were obsolete because in the wake of the presumed death of tonality (and with the advent of the equal tempered tuning system) nobody could legitimately write rondos any longer. 

 

As I was saying earlier, Rick Beato’s concern is that nothing can become a big enough of a hit to create social cohesion if nothing is big enough to catch on.  I take Bryan Townsend’s point that Taylor Swift is popular and well-known and that a crack team of pop-meisters from Sweden tend to dominate.  This has been taking shape since the Clinton administration and got discussed a bit in John Seabrook’s The Song Machine.

 

Leonard Meyer floated a few ideas about what might happen moving on from 1967 in Music, the Arts, and Ideas: 

 

The ideal of individualism and the goal of intense personal expression have now been repudiated by two of the important ideologies of our time and have been derogated by some traditional artists. In their place has been substituted the concept of the work of art as an objective construct. Originality is no longer tied to the discovery of means expressive of an artist's inner experience, but to the ordering of materials; and creativity is seen not as an act of self-revelation, but as a species of problem-solving. Since any style can constitute a basis for objective construction and for the presentation of principles of order, such views are not incompatible with the use of past art works as sources for materials, relational patterns, and syntactic procedures and norms. Form and technique have thus superseded inspiration and expression. Logically, all modes of organization and all styles become equally available and viable.    page 188

 

Well, to that I’d say Meyer was wrong.  Ted Gioia has called for Romanticism 2.0 and the emergence of a new counterculture.  I say we don’t need Romanticism 2.0 because Meyer correctly said we never got out of Romanticism 1.0!  Meyer suggested that the kinds of artists he called formalists were most likely to become the heroes of their day but what would that entail?  I think inspiration and expression are not going to go out of style but I do think Meyer was on to something noting the loss of a shared vocabulary within which “expression” could be taken as given. If we look at this next suggestion by Meyer it could be read, here in 2024, as an anticipation of mash-up culture, sampling, pastiche and other recombinant approaches to genre:

 

If a work of art is an impersonal construct, and creation a kind of problem-solving, then experiments with mixtures of means and materials, either within or between works, need not constitute an imperfection. On the contrary, the skillful and elegant combinations of disparate styles (or of ideas borrowed from different works and different composers) within a single work may become a challenging and attractive problem.   pages 190-191

 

 

... if earlier styles and materials are employed in contemporary art, music and literature, it will most likely be done by those inclined toward formalism, rather than by those who still consider works of art to be vehicles for personal expression. One cannot "use" the expressive quality of a Bach, a Rembrandt, or a Donne. ... In like manner, it will probably be the formalist rather than the expressionist who delights in the possibilities of mixing styles and materials from different epochs within a work or in employing different stylistic models in successive works.

...

 

That this is indeed the case is shown by the fact that it has been avowed and explicit formalists, such as Eliot and Stravinsky, who have employed past procedures, models, and materials most patently and most extensively. And we are thus confronted with an amusing paradox: the end of the Renaissance--of belief in teleology, individualism, expression, and so forth--has made possible a return to the styles and materials originally fostered by those beliefs.   ...  page 191

 

 

...  If this analysis is correct, it should follow that in the future a particular past will be favored and explored because of the specifically artistic problems it poses rather than because of the ideological position it represents.   page 193

 

 

Star Wars hadn’t even happened yet and certainly not steampunk as a subgenre within manga.   Meyer’s examples of T. S. Eliot and Igor Stravinsky as the arch-formalists of the 20th century in poetry and music were well-chosen because they were both fond of formal explorations and genre blurring gestures. 

 

My personal interest has been in looking at the ways in which “pop” and “classical” reception histories among academics have tended to balkanize.  Poptimist and rockist approaches exist in pop and classical.  The “back to roots” types want their pet genre “redeemed” by being purged of extraneous or defiling elements.  We don’t have to look too far within classical music for the formerly-named Future Symphony Institute.  Among fans of rock the back-to-basic guys tend to announce themselves. 

 

The death of music genres that Rick Beato has observed can certainly be a real thing but he noticed (I suspect) that this has been happening for a while.  Leonard Meyer noticed it had been happening in the mid-20th century. 

 

We’re better off if we allow genres and styles to be treated as flexible realms of the possible.  The demise of grunge doesn’t see me shedding any tears.  I actually hated most grunge but I’m not going to hold it against Rick Beato if he loves the style.  He loves Stevie Wonder so we can agree on that.  And here we are half a century from Innervisions and people still love “Superstition” and if people are even listening to Cornelius Cardew or Stockhausen, well, okay.


Tuesday, June 29, 2021

Alan Jacobs concedes his stab at a history of critical theory wasn't so great but that Alexander Stern does a good job of explaining the actual Adorno vs. the imaginary Adorno conservatives think they're refuting

I'm not ... too hugely shocked that Alan Jacobs concluded his attempt to provide a history of critical theory wasn't as good or clear as it could have been.  

...
I have written about the inept history linking the Frankfurt School to contemporary social-justice movements, but not in the kind of compelling detail that Stern offers here. 
So he points us in the direction of Alexander Stern's essay "Critical Theory and the Newest Left".

Saturday, February 01, 2020

Bryan Townsend on "The Awkward Concept of `Classic'" and critics, a counterproposal, the critic has become more and not less important to declaring things "beyond genre" as a marketing move rather than a critical stance

http://themusicsalon.blogspot.com/2020/01/the-awkward-concept-of-classic.html

...
It is interesting that the whole post-modern project of demeaning and dismissing the whole idea of classic and indeed, quality, is also associated with the idea of doing away with genre, i.e. regional characteristics. The music of Billie Eilish, for example, is described as "genre-bending." Any time a new artist comes along, like Lil Nas X, his music is "genre-defying." You see, if you want to get rid of all the traditional concepts of quality like "classic" and "canon" then you also want to get rid of the idea of genre. Because if there is such a thing as genre, an artist can be criticized for failing to deliver a good example of the genre. If Mozart were a lesser composer he might have written a poor minuet qua minuet. But if we are bending and defying genres, then the critic has no ground to stand on.

Isn't that convenient?

In fact, if what you want to do is remove all possibility of criticism so you can foist pretty much anything on an unsuspecting public, then removing possible grounds for criticism is an excellent tactic. Notice how remarkably feeble criticism is these days. When a new movie comes out that no-one wants to see, the main criticism is that no-one went to it. Then, as in the case of Cats, critics can lambaste it for all sorts of failings. But genuine criticism, such as came from Martin Scorsese recently, is so rare that it is front page news.

The concept of classic involves being true to a regional characteristic. The terroir in the case of French wine, or the varietal in the case of most wines outside France. In the case of music, the genre of "symphony" even in the 21st century, has certain fundamental characteristics. A symphony by Haydn, Mahler, Shostakovich or even Stravinsky, shares some basic aesthetic goals.

Can the post-modern project do away with all this? Yes, of course, but it will severely compromise all non-commercial art forms because it takes away the fundamental ways to understand and appreciate art and replaces them with nothing more than political correctness.
...

I would say that I don't agree that the reason music gets described as "genre bending"  or "genre defying" is an effort to get rid of standards of criticism.  Standards of criticism still exist but they may not necessarily be in the realm of aesthetics.  Controversies that have erupted in the realm of young adult fiction publishing and reception have revolved around demographic purity, for want of a better way to put things.  If X is going to write about topic Y then author X had better be able to establish bona fides for being in a demographic that is considered fit to write about topic Y, as the recent controversy surrounding American Dirt has been bringing to light (as in a variety of other cases).  Variations on Uncle Tom's Cabin on the part of white writers addressing issues faced by people of color are more problematic now than they would have been in earlier epochs of publishing in the West.

There are writers who specialize in the arts who make a point of explicitly rejecting a Matthew Arnold style art-religion as something that evolved in the 19th century and which tended to favor a Euro-centric approach to the arts.  This doesn't require that anyone who doesn't subscribed to Arnoldian art religion has to reject canons.  I wouldn't be all that shocked that New England Puritans who rejected any attempt to sacramentalize art would not be rejecting such a move on the basis of rejecting canons.  To try to summarize this point as succinctly as possible, observantly religious people can have closed canons of sacred texts and completely open-ended canons of hymnody and religiously contemplative art.  A Thomas A. Dorsey or a Martin Luther or a Charles Wesley could add songs to Christian hymnody without feeling any obligation to suggest that there needed to be extra books in the Bible is a colloquial way to put it.  Contemporary objections in musicology to the established symphonic and chamber music canons of the 19th century can be understood as rejecting what seems in the Matthew Arnold style art religion as a tendency to treat the divine revelation of art as having been closed.  No one can top Beethoven's Ninth so there's not much reason to write more symphonies is the strawman formulation of the argument but it may be useful as a way to understand the distinction between canons and what some musicologists describe as vices of "canonism".

However ... where I may differ from Bryan is on what this can indicate about the role of the journalist and academic in all of this contemporary moment.

Film critics can declare that Aronofksy's mother! is an important film about climate change or the cult of celebrity or whatever film critics decide to say it's about but do you want to know the title of a movie that made more money in terms of global and domestic box office?  That would by My Little Pony.  A friend of mine was complaining about how he noticed that television journalists talked endlessly about shows like Game of Thrones or Mad Men when a show like NCIS is seen by millions more people and journalists covering television seem to have gone on blithely as if NCIS doesn't necessarily exist.  Noah Berlatsky had a sharp-edged, if over-stated, way of explaining this dynamic--until the critic declares that something is art worth talking about it's not even really art.

That's an over-statement, of course, made for a rhetorical effect but the point is worth mentioning because I think Berlatsky has zeroed in on the ways in which art criticism and art history have been intertwined in the last few centuries in ways that we can forget if we haven't gotten to observing how in ... let's just call it pre-modern times there was no critical establishment of the sort we take for granted that would set itself the task of adjudicating these issues.

If anything the new era of criticism from about the eighteenth century on into the present centralizes the role of the critic.  Saying that something is "beyond genre" ensures that the person who declares that an artwork of musical work is "beyond genre" is the one who has the power to say so.

That song forms derived from Tin Pan Alley formats and strophic patterns in the last century of songwriting aren't that fundamentally different from strophic forms and binary forms and ternary forms from the last thousand years of song doesn't have to come up.  "Beyond genre" refers less to any general structural patterns than to juxtapositions of timbrel elements that are regarded as central to a specific sound.  I.e. if a banjo is used in anything that's not "hillbilly" or "country" then that in itself "defies genre".  Ninth chords become "jazzy" unless we're talking about someone like Durufle.

That contemporary critics and academics object to canonism more than canons I get.  That makes sense.  I have never been a huge fan of Schubert so if there's less Schubert I don't exactly mind ... but the bad faith element is that contemporary pundits aren't quite admitting they are trying to set up a new canon.  Academics are working from or setting up canons by the nature of their work, as are critics.


https://wenatcheethehatchet.blogspot.com/2019/01/jacques-ellul-on-role-criticism-and.html

THE EMPIRE OF NON-SENSE: ART IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
Jacques Ellul
Copyright (c) 2014 by Papadakis Publisher
translated by Michael Johnson and David Lovekin
ISBN 978-1-906506-40-7

page 152 (emphases added)

In this vast universe, the art critic finally achieves his principal role. The artist is only a secondary element in relation to the critic who makes and unmakes styles and reputations.  ... Let us note that the art critic is a recent development. This man who is a scholar of the material in question, music or novel, painting or poetry, who knows all that can be known, who is the true expert in all his knowledge of the imaginary museum; that man, a specialist, a meticulous connoisseur of all the techniques, is incapable of producing anything by himself, but, as the occupant of the public podium, he makes his opinions known. He promulgates evaluations, and he reveals the philosophy and meaning of these works. He decrees what is good for the general welfare, and what will be the legacy of our present world for the future.  He can add nothing to this legacy but his explanations. The art critic did not exist in the seventeenth century, although there were a few hints. In reality, he is a product of the bourgeois, industrial, mass society; he is a shareholder in the culture, whose conscious and willful reality originates in the same era (along with the idea of culture), ... The critic owes his existence to the mutation of the bourgeoisie: the bourgeois, perhaps uncultured, harried and involved with other needs, and dedicated to utility, does not possess the same understanding of art as the aristocrat. For the latter, there was no need for explanation. By contrast, the bourgeois, the philistine of the Gilded Age, needed explanations, needed to be led to understanding. And, just as businessmen needed their brokers, so, in matters of art, the bourgeois needed their critics in order to discern what kind of art to buy. And for the Bourgeois buying art is an act of status. He must not make a mistake. First and foremost, the critic guarantees the durability and lasting value of the work in question.  The critic is just another business agent whose job is to guarantee status. 


page 153
... The art critic is a publicity agent for modern art. ... The link between the discourse of the critic and art itself is so essential that it appears, for example, in the view of Abraham Moles, as a proof of art's vitality. Everywhere they have proclaimed the death of Art, he asserts; now we are witnessing an "unprecedented flourishing of doctrines and movements," which prove that art is alive. However, these doctrines are the work of critics. They produce an infinite amount of discourse on art, but one must remember that this is not art. ...

Ellul's comment I quoted at the end of the excerpts seems salient in our era, the proliferation of doctrines about art are not things we should take as a sign that the arts world is healthy.

Contra Virgil Thomson, the arts journalist was always a publicity agent for modern art, even if Thomson's point that arts criticism was the holdout in journalism against everything being paid advertising.  That can be true at a paradoxical level in the sense that the arts critic can refuse to jump on a bandwagon or endorse the work of a specific artist or composer (like Sibelius) while still participating in the press in a way that is in keeping with what Ellul described as being the role of the publicity agent for modern art.

The move in the last twenty years to start describing this or that songwriter or composer as "beyond genre" or "blurring genre" probably has nothing to do with whether or not X or Y is really "beyond genre" or "blurring genre".  If X or Y is making any money in the  music industry at all that pays for bills and groceries and housing then X or Y, whoever they are, has been coded into a genre simply for the sake of booking gigs and making sales.

To put this as bluntly as possible, who is deciding that Billie Eilish is "beyond genre"?  Journalists and marketers, more or less the strata of people in the music industry who in a previous century might have rushed to categorize Eilish as being in a genre when promoting her work.

Admiring as I do the works of the Scott Joplin/John Stark "school of ragtime", I'm reminded that if you go back and look at how the Stark rags were promoted and discussed they were promoted as music openly bidding to be considered alongside Chopin as serious music.  Joplin was aiming to add his music to an existing canon.  As Joseph Horowitz has been writing lately, we should remember that Joplin thought of himself as a concert music composer who aspired to contribute to concert music.  Horowitz wrote at his blog recently:
...
Dvorak directed New York City’s National Conservatory of Music from 1892 to 1895 – in the rise-and-fall of American classical music, a period of peak promise and high achievement. It speaks volumes that he chose as his personal assistant a young African-American baritone who had eloquently acquired the sorrow songs from his grandfather, a former slave. This was Harry Burleigh, who after Dvorak died turned spirituals into concert songs with electrifying success. (If you’ve ever heard Marian Anderson or Paul Robeson sing “Deep River,” that’s Burleigh.) During the Harlem Renaissance, Burleigh’s arrangements were reconsidered by Zora Neale Hurston and Langston Hughes, both of whom detected a “flight from blackness” to the white concert stage. Today, Burleigh’s “appropriation” of the black vernacular is of course newly controversial. That he was inspired by a white composer of genius becomes an uncomfortable fact. An alternative reading, based not on fact but on theory, is that racist Americans impelled him to “whiten” black roots. Burleigh emerges a victim, his agency diminished. 
Compounding this confusion is another prophet: W E. B. Du Bois, who like Dvorak foresaw a black American classical music to come. The pertinent lineage from Dvorak to Burleigh includes the ragtime king Scott Joplin (who considered himself a concert composer) and the once famous black British composer Samuel Coleridge-Taylor, urged by Du Bois, Burleigh, and Paul Lawrence Dunbar to take up Dvorak’s prophecy. After Coleridge-Taylor came notable black symphonists of the 1930s and forties: William Grant Still, William Dawson, and Florence Price, all of them today being belatedly and deservedly rediscovered.
But the same lineage leads to George Gershwin and Porgy and Bess: a further source of discomfort. I have even been advised, at an American university, to omit Gershwin’s name from a two-day Coleridge-Taylor celebration. But Coleridge-Taylor’s failure to fulfill Dvorak’s prophecy – he was too decorous, too Victorian – cannot be contextualized without exploring the ways and reasons that Gershwin did it better. As for Gershwin’s opera: even though Porgy is a hero, a moral paragon, it today seems virtually impossible to deflect accusations of derogatory “stereotyping.” The mere fact that he is a physical cripple, ambulating on a goat-cart, frightens producers and directors into minimizing Porgy’s physical debility. But a Porgy who can stand is paradoxically diminished: the trajectory of his triumphant odyssey – of a “cripple made whole” — is truncated. (On Porgy and Bess at the Met, click here.)
Gershwin discomfort is mild compared to the consternation Arthur Farwell (1872-1952)invites. He, too, embraced Dvorak’s prophecy. As the leading composer in an “Indianists” movement lasting into the 1930s, Farwell believed it was a democratic obligation of Americans of European descent to try to understand the indigenous Americans they displaced and oppressed – to preserve something of their civilization; to find a path toward reconciliation. His Indianist compositions attempt to mediate between Native American ritual and the Western concert tradition. Like Bela Bartok in Transylvania, like Igor Stravinsky in rural Russia, he endeavored to fashion a concert idiom that would paradoxically project the integrity of unvarnished vernacular dance and song. He aspired to capture specific musical characteristics – but also something additional, something ineffable and elemental, “religious and legendary.” He called it – a phrase anachronistic today – “race spirit.”
...
If in the past music journalists and academics decided that whatever popular reception a Florence Price received for her symphonies they weren't as important as works by other composers (and we should note that Price (1887-1953) lived during a volatile period in which Stravinsky, Bartok, Schoenberg, Berg, Webern, Hindemith, Shostakovich, Debussy and other composers were all active or becoming active) in the present age journalists and academics are attempting to right the wrongs of ignoring African American and women composers from the past.  If there's a bad faith element to that activism it is attacking the idea of "canonism" in a way that does not concede that a new canon is being developed as an alternative.  As Jacques Ellul put it in The New Demons, the old sacred can't be displaced without the installation of a new sacred to replace it.  Humans venerate and sacralize something and the question we have to look at is what is being reverenced.

What Horowitz has been highlighting about Farwell reception is how contemporary music journalism and performance practices have sidelined Farwell for drawing inspiration from Native American music and Native American cultures.  The Indianists can be presented as emblematic  of white colonial power in the now even though they were viewed a bit more like crackpots operating under a naive and misguided belief that Native American music was even worth emulating during Farwell's day.

More to the point I'm trying to make, if Gershwin has become problematic for having made use of African American musical styles as a fountain of inspiration, Arthur Farwell has fared worse by failing on the basis of a purity test that speaks to twenty-first century academic and journalistic concerns.  If in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the mainstream in Western music journalism and academia scorned the idea of using Native American music a figure like Arthur Farwell can end up marginal in two different centuries for possibly opposing reasons.  He was marginal in his life for wanting to draw inspiration from Native American music and has been deliberately ignored in the present for having been found guilty of cultural appropriation.

Those composers who ignored Native American music may have been sort of damned for just continuing the "white" traditions of the avant garde (a la Stravinsky or Schoenberg) ,but in our contemporary journalistic climate anyone who was not a person of color who made the mistake of writing and publishing works openly acknowledging a debt of influence to music made by people of color could be even more damned for doing so by being guilty of cultural appropriation. Contemporary music journalists who advocate for composers of color may not entirely realize that this double bind is being imposed on dead composers who can't possibly get out of the double bind that twenty-first century music journalists and academics have imposed upon composers who aren't alive to make a defense.

Farwell's music can be on the losing end no matter which way the tide of journalistic fads may turn while the music journalists and academics themselves have their platforms.  Even in cases where those who have a low regard for Farwell's life and music are people of color they, too, can have a platform if they are working in the current music industry or in musicology in some capacity.  That music journalists can anoint a style like punk as the "in" thing while denigrating progressive rock isn't hard to look up.  A drummer like Neil Peart can end up on the wrong side of music journalism if a band like Rush wasn't The Clash or The Sex Pistols or The Ramones, for instance, but a lot can change in music journalism in forty years.  What apparently doesn't change is how marginal musicians who are in some way symbolically shut out of "serious" by music journalism as an institution tend to remain until the fads of music journalism shift.

Does that mean a lot of Arthur Farwell's music doesn't come across as rather kitsch?  No, there's some music he's written I think is interesting and a decent chunk of it I've heard that comes across as parlor music kitsch because times and aesthetics change.  I'm finding his Polytonal Studies interesting and his Native American pictorial pieces aren't bad but they don't quite stick with me.  That doesn't mean I think Farwell should be thought of strictly in terms of contemporary polemics to the effect that his music shouldn't get a hearing because he was found guilty of cultural appropriation.

With respect to Dvorak's advice that American composers draw inspiration from African American and Native American music the double bind couldn't be more clear, there can be swaths of music journalism and academia in which American composers are damned if they don't draw inspiration from African American and Native American musical styles but, if they're white, they're even more damned if they do.  In an era of the American Dirt controversy simplistic moralizing messages may not be the real problem, the problem seems to be that if you're going to offer a moralizing message in the arts you need to actually be the demographic you aim to present or represent in your art in order to be accepted as legitimate.

Who gets to decide when and whether a composer has or hasn't succeeded on that score?  Critics, more or less.  Although it's possible to argue that Stravinsky and Schoenberg were the most important composers in the West in the twentieth century and have that be true (and Theodor Adorno's Philosophy of New Music may have done a great deal to cement that axiom by way of setting up a polarity in the aesthetics in which Schoenberg and Stravinsky were presented by Adorno as opposed polarities in aesthetics, if not necessarily politics)) it is just as plausible now to argue that the influence of Schoenberg beyond the twentieth century has been marginal at best.

Schoenberg's intra-concert music innovations seemed to invigorate "classsical music" for a while but as various people across the spectrum of traditionalists to radicals have pointed out, what Schoenberg accomplished could be seen as a kind of stop-gap.  Ben Johnston proposed that Schoenberg's stop-gap solution to the apparent "exhaustion" of traditional tonality in the equal-tempered system retained the organicism inherent in the aesthetic commitments of Romantic and post-Romantic compositional technique and theory but that the trouble was that with the advent of serialism atonality played itself out even more swiftly than tonality did.

Of course Schoenberg, unlike a number of his disciples, said after Gershwin's death that George Gershwin was a composer and a musician. Schoenberg also admitted he genuinely liked what people called "light music" made by Americans and went so far as to suggest that perhaps some of the greatest musicians in American culture had already been making great music but would be overlooked by those who could only accept that "great" American music had to come from "serious" quarters.  Schoenberg was also noted for the record saying there was still plenty of music to be written in the key of C major.

Decades ago Theodore Gracyk developed some terms, "ontologically thick" and "ontologically thin" to describe the difference between popular music and concert music in connection to their mediating technologies. The short version is that music created and conveyed through the mechanical/electronic recording process is "ontologically thick", that's to say that creators and fans of this category of music venerate masters and master takes and original release forms but also alternate takes and it matters what the timbres are--it matters if Dave Gilmour was playing a Telecaster or a Stratocaster to obtain a particular electric guitar sound for a particular track.  At the opposite end would be J. S. Bach's Art of Fugue, written in open score form with the four independent melodic lines of a fugue written out note for note but with no indication of dynamics, no indication even of what instrument(s) the work should be played on.  In principle anyone with enough musical literacy in this tradition of score-reading could play the work at a keyboard or as a string quartet or a woodwind quartet or as a four-part chorus.  Art of Fugue might be one of the most archetypal "ontologically thin" works of music in the history of the Western "classical" traditions.

Now to say that Billie Eilish blurs or is beyond genre might be like saying Tori Amos got some formal music training but decided to play her own songs rather than play Debussy.  This is not so unique in the history of music or even the history of music since the birth of the commercial music industries involving printed sheet music and mechanical recording.  May Aufderheide had formal music training but chose to write and publish songs as well as piano rags.  Ragtime has been presented as the musical innovation of African American musicians, which it was ... but ragtime scholars and specialists have also pointed out that it was a music made popular but middle-class white women willing to play the music and who also, lest we forget, were able and willing to write and publish rags themselves.  Not all of that music was of the "classic rag" style, the style that was consciously cultivated by Scott Joplin and the John Stark publishing community of musicians.

As Edward A. Berlin and other ragtime historians have noted, maybe a total of ten percent of all published ragtime was the solo piano literature we've probably been taught was "the" quintessential music of ragtime as a style.  Most of the published music was song, many of those songs less sophisticated in rhythm and melodic content and harmonic content than the classic rags we have received from the likes of Scott Joplin, James Scott and Joseph Lamb.  Those rags can be construed as in the "upper tenth" in terms of technical demands and formal complexity.

Which is another way of saying the ragtime revival of the mid-twentieth century was in a sense the creation of musicians and critics together and as much as I love the classic/classical rags I think it's important to highlight that presenting that body of music as "the" definition of ragtime is a selective and potentially serious misrepresentation of ragtime as a whole.  To read the arguments for and against ragtime as a form of popular song is to learn, bit by bit, that the closest comparable debate to be had about the musical and literary merit of a popular American style in terms of debates about the propriety of stereotypology regarding race and sex would be rap in general and gangster rap more particularly.  Scott Joplin himself was famously dismayed at what he regarded as the ghastly racial caricatures and depictions of violence and sexuality in ragtime as a genre of popular song.  Joplin's piano rags have become classics, and even made it into the classical music canon, which would have been what Joplin wanted.  Joplin's songs and his opera Treemonisha have not cemented a secure place in the concert music canon and it remains to be seen if they will.

Scott Joplin has been one of my musical heroes for decades now and that he sang in vocal quartets and wrote piano music hints at what, though obvious for me, might need to be spelled for readers who aren't already familiar with the scope and ambition of his work.  Translating his aims and means a bit, Scott Joplin's work has lasted as long as it has, even works that have arguably not been successful in achieving their aims, like his opera, because Joplin worked within popular music but wrote music and expressed views that aimed to elevate that popular style.  We live in an era in which concepts of ethnic or racial purity can go in and come from more than one direction.  Joplin's music, as John McWhorter recently put it, could seem like juice and cookies compared to the much hotter sound of jazz that was being born just around the time Scott Joplin died.  Elijah Wald has written about how there is a popular narrative or myth in music journalism and music history which has it that there's a century or centuries long history of white people appropriating sounds that were developed by African diaspora musicians and that while Wald subscribes strongly to this narrative/myth he recognizes that it is, in fact, a narrative or a myth, an etiological account of music but particularly American popular music.

The problem with such an explanatory myth is that it won't do so much to explain the evolution of microtonal experimentalism in what is now the Czech republic a century ago.  It also can't easily account for Toru Takemitsu's work even if Takemitsu told the musical world he drew inspiration from George Russell (yay!) and Olivier Messiaen (also yay!).  If we are told to define African diaspora music only in terms of the music produced and promoted by the American popular music industry then figures like Florence Price or George Walker, let alone non-American Afro-European composers like Samuel Coleridge-Taylor or Joseph Bologne or the Afro-Cuban composer Leo Brouwer will get ignored if, indeed, they are even recognized.

Leo Brouwer has commented on how fusion is not something academics have wanted to take seriously because academics are, by disposition and training, inclined to discuss whatever musical styles will fit into the categories they can teach in classrooms.  As I get older and consider how my musical education and musical life was defined chiefly by a mixture of choral singing and guitar playing that encompassed folk-pop, progressive rock and also classical music I get a sense that there is something about the music industrial network and associated music education regimes that is basically antithetical in practice, regardless of any explicit repudiation of this if directly asked, to the elimination of the boundaries that are colloquially known as "high" and "low" or between what can be called "pop" and "classical".  Partisans in both camps (as if there were merely two but bear with me) are committed to the sacredness of their pop and classical.  A figure like Scott Joplin could be immensely popular while aspiring to create music that joined the classical canon and Joplin died; a century after his death Joplin's work has more or less made it into the classical/concert music canon but in a sense at the expense of having become a kind of forgotten figure in pop music.  Yet Joplin is important because he occupied a liminal role in which his music and his talent and ambition could be recognized across the pop/classical divides that had been evolving within the nascent music industries.

What I find implausible about "beyond genre" and "blurring genre" is that more often than not those claims are made by industry insiders about industry insiders whose work will not be the least bit difficult to categorize within categories like "pop" or "classical" or "new music" or avant garde or, whatever label you pick, the label can still fit.  Billie Eilish may or may not be Bjork for a new generation of music consumers and music journalists.  We'll just have to see but that I can make such a comparison should convey what I'm trying to say, that however much Duke Ellington extolled the value of music "beyond category" the reality has been and likely always will be that there will always be a category for music and music will be judged on the basis of categories.  To say that a musical work is beyond category could, however, mean that it can be appreciated beyond one kind of category which is what I take people mean when they invoke "beyond category".  Ellington wrote music in a popular style that he hoped could be appreciated beyond that simple category, he was writing music that clearly worked as popular music that he also wanted people to be able to hear as art.

By now I hope you've gotten a hunch, if you haven't worked out already, that a number of my musical heroes have been composers whose work deliberately blurred the boundaries between "pop" and "classical".  I admit to some skepticism about concerns by industry insiders about cultural appropriation not so much because I think that the worst infractions of cultural appropriation as they get described are praiseworthy, I'm skeptical about allegations that a George Gershwin in pop or an Arthur Farwell in concert music was guilty of cultural appropriation because the charges seem to be made with an implicit narrative or myth of racial purity at their base.  White guys shouldn't be stealing music from people of color.

The problem is that, after having read Wagner's anti-semitic rants, I find it awkward and even just plain morally objectionable to attempt to define authenticity in music based on categories that say this or that music is sufficiently purely "white" or "black" to be "real", much like I find it hard to take seriously allegations that Mendelssohn was light or frivolous as a composer having read Wagner's rants about Jews and their not being able to capture the soul of real authentic music of the Volk.  I find it troubling that within an American context any music journalists, music historians and music educators could simply flip the script of Wagner's rant on Jews and German soulful music, substitute black and white or white and black, and then run with that script as though it were different in style and substance.  If the goal of liberals and of contemporary Western liberalism is to work toward a more truly integrated society then judging music on the basis of race mythologies, whether the myth of pure black or pure white music, is inimical to the pursuit of those goals.

By contrast, I suggest that making a mission of obliterating the formal and conceptual categories and boundaries that have been used to differentiate between "high" and "low" music, between the broad categories known as "pop" and "classical" and doing so in a way that maintains the formal and gestural-linear developmental scripts of the concert music idioms while applying them to the vocabulary of vernacular or popular styles is relatively easy to do.  Think of it as socialist realism in which "folk" is replaced with any popular musical idiom of your choice--rap, country, jazz, blues, ragtime, Polish folk song, Serbian folk song, Han melodies and so on.  Or you could think of it as making a case that essentialist tropes about "inherent tendencies of the material" that emerged in music pedagogy are just wrong.  As George Rochberg put it, we are not the slaves of history, we can decide what future we want to pursue.  Another way Rochberg put it is objecting that to say that there is any "inherent tendency to the musical materials" is to deny that musicians can make choices, that we can make artistic decisions.

It is not coincidental that much of the most memorable popular musical styles were developed and refined by African American musicians and this in both the North and South American continents.  I recognize some may disagree but I think that working to bridge the boundaries between popular song forms and the large-scale developmental processes associated with the forms developed in the eighteenth century practice (as distinct, perhaps even very distinct, from the norms of those forms as described by nineteenth century Western music pedagogy) is a productive path forward.  I admire a lot of what has gone on in microtonal composition from composers like Ben Johnston and Alois Haba and Kyle Gann, for instance, but I'm committed to playing an instrument, the six-stringed guitar, that is still mostly fixed to equal temperament at a mainstream level.  I don't have the budget to go in for microtonal fingerboards.

On the other hand, you've probably worked out that my interest has been in working within equal temperament to melt down the boundaries that have been erected by a century or two of music pedagogy and music history set up not just by classical fans but by jazz and pop and blues and country fans--I'm suggesting that we consider the possibility that for generations of musicians a vision of an integrated musical world has been held back by systemic racism perpetuated within and by the music industries themselves, not just the classical music purists who want only the proverbial Beethoven but the blues purists who want their Robert Johnson as if he couldn't have played showtunes from Broadway productions.

So, anyway, some thoughts on music and aesthetics and music history for the weekend, such as they are.

POSTSCRIPT

As I've been thinking about these kinds of musical issues for decades, basically since I was in college, I'm thinking about something Adorno said about the reactionary criticisms of modern music and how they should not be dismissed out of hand for they can point to real aesthetic problems.  I've thought about this particularly since the death of Roger Scruton and have skimmed through some of the boilerplate written about him by liberals, progressives and conservatives.  Adorno's comment that a generally liberal stance will be insufficient to the problems of composition can be translated a bit--the trouble I sometimes have with the liberal who wants a more just and musically integrated soundworld in which the music of white and black musicians can be received and loved as an integrated whole is not the goal itself.  I am all in favor of having Haydn and Stevie Wonder co-existing in a musical canon because for me they already do. 

My concern, which I came to discover was in some ways anticipated by Adorno's criticism of new music and generic liberal defenses of new music, is that liberals can be so committed to whatever ideological or rhetorical flourishes they feel need to be made they commit to that process without really getting to the practical musical problems that would have to be solved in order to get us there and the practical musical problems that would have to be solved in order to get us there involve reams of formal analysis, music history, historiography and consideration of how the problems of segregating sounds were devised and implemented by the music industries and educational establishments.

In other words, the professionals created these problems and we're supposed to take their word for it that they will solve the problems that their ancestors created.  When Jesus rebuked the Pharisees one of the things he said was that they told themselves they would not have done what their forefathers did to the prophets thereby confessing they were the descendants of those people who tortured and rejected the prophets.  In this analogy the Pharisees are those musical academics and journalists and pundits across the whole range of spectrums who have functionally been committed more to the idea of stylistic or ethnic purity than to solving any of the problems of integrating musical idioms and cultures.  This could be a fan of Schubert who praises Schubert's willingness to bend or break the musical conventions of the eighteenth century who then turns around and laments that music today is just so bad.  Well, sure, a lot of it is bad but I don't even really necessarily like Schubert.  This could also be someone who feels obliged to knock The Monkees compared to The Beatles because the former were a pre-fab boy band capitalizing on the popularity of the latter.  Sure, but The Monkees had some okay pop songs. 

The veneration or rejection of the Romantic era artist-prophet-seer-visionary trope seems to be at the core of a lot of fore and against.  I respect that there are musicologists who are openly attacking the Romantic legacy and what they regard as the negative effects of the post-Idealist project in music theory, pedagogy and analysis.  On the other hand, I am frustrated that in the process of attempting to shake off a centuries old symphonic tradition that feels stifling people aren't just doing what a Berlioz did or anyone in the eighteenth century who said "out with the old to make room for the new already"--instead we get the plea wrapped inside master narratives of colonialism, imperialism, white supremacy and things like that.  Did the European colonial powers do terrible things to the rest of the world?  Absolutely, but I don't want the slavery systems of the Native American tribes to come back and I don't want the African slave trades to the European powers or to India to get revived (assuming all of these slave trades have actually been eliminated, which is an entirely different matter). 

The trouble, to put it more sharply, is that Americans who are part of an empire that has the weaponry to render the entire planet uninhabitable are going on about the repressive and oppressive legacy of dead white males when the executive, regardless of skin color, has the option of using a drone strike to take out anyone anywhere almost the world over on the basis of U.S. policy decisions.  That's a level of power that was inconceivable to even the most terrible despots of the last two centuries. 

I think about this more as I get older since my dad was Native American and my mom's white but musicology and music writers may have to reach a moment where they decide whether what they want to promote and pursue is musical integration as symbolic of racial integration and reconciliation or whether what they want to promote is what has been promoted over the last century of commercial music, a range of essentialist stereotypes in which blacks are blacks and hicks are hicks and Asians are Asians and never shall any of these borrow from the other musical cultures because that won't sell units.  I can appreciate what people want to attain by highlighting the problems of cultural appropriation but I remain unconvinced that policing the means of production is going to give artists more freedom to experiment toward the end of a more integrated national soundscape. 

I also believe that if there were a more concerted effort to bridge the frequently industry-imposed barriers between "pop" and "classical" or "pop" and "jazz" or "jazz" and "classical" and so on that the collaborations that could be possible could ameliorate elements that have been identified as cultural appropriation in some contexts.  As someone who's not a professional musician who has been reading about music and making music for decades I've started to wonder whether the music industries (including education) are fully aware of the double bind that resides within the push-pull of wanting a more integrated and racially conscious musical canon (because that's what people want even if they can't concede the point in the process of rejecting canonism) but also wanting to be able to explicate music in terms of essentially racial paradigms. 

A century from now the canon of Anglo-American pop could be seen as no less emblematic of an Atlanticist American-European hegemony than what some musicologists regard as the hegemonic influence of a post-Schenkerian German musical canon.  That Heinrich Schenker's efforts to build a pre-Wagnerian German canon might, as Nicholas Cook has proposed, have been an effort to develop a canon of German music that pre-dated explicitly cultural anti-Semitism can be lost on American writers.  That doesn't mean we have to stop ignoring Schenker but I'm suggesting it's possible to try to be fair to what Schenker thought he was doing based on his work on scholarly interaction with that work rather than on a stereotyped American reaction to an Americanized conception of Schenker's work.  But I digress ... and this is pretty long for a postscript.

Monday, August 26, 2019

Adorno in Philosophy of New Music, "... music must emancipate itself as well from twelve-tone technique." comparing that to Ellul's observations on art in technocratic societies



PHILOSOPHY OF NEW MUSIC
Theodore Adorno
Copyright (c)2006 by the Regents of the Univesrity of Minnesota
translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor
ISBN-13: 978-0-8166-3666-2
ISBN-10: 0-8166-3666-4


page 45

... This is the origin of twelve-tone technique. It culminates in the will to abolish the fundamental contradiction in occidental music, that between the polyphonic fugue and the homophonic sonata.

We'll come back to this when I discuss, briefly, August Halm.

page 47

[on the subject of twelve-tone technique] Nothing unthematic remains, nothing that is not to be understood as having derived from what is identical in however latent a fashion.
...
Leonard B. Meyer might have had a comment about how this was late late Romanticism as an articulation of the ideology of organicism as a paradigm of musical development.

page 53

... The arithmetical play of twelve-tone technique and the constraint that it exercises is reminiscent of astrology, and it is no mere fad that many of its adepts fall pretty to it.  As a system closed in on itself and at the same time self-opaque, twelve-tone rationality--in which the constellation of means is immediately hypostatized as goal and law--verges on superstition. The legality in which it is executed is at the same time simply inflicted on the material that it determines without, however, this determination serving any meaning. Exactitude, as mathematical calculation, is substituted  for what traditional art knew as idea, which in late romanticism itself unquestionably degenerated into ideology as the affirmation of a metaphysical ...

page 54
... The question that twelve-tone composition poses to the composer is not how musical meaning can be organized but rather how organization can become meaningful. What Schoenberg has produced over the past twenty-five years are progressive attempts at an answer to this question. ... What is domineering in these late gestures, however, responds to what is tyrannical in the origin of the system itself. Twelve-tone exactitude, which banishes all meaning as if it were an illusion claiming to exist in itself in the musical object, treats music according to the schema of fate. 

... Twelve-tone technique is truly its fate. It subjugates music by setting it free. The subject rules over the music by means of a rational system in order to succumb to this rational system itself. ...


page 89
... In other words, if it is to hope to make it through the winter, music must emancipate itself as well from twelve-tone technique. This emancipation , however, is not to be accomplished by a return to the irrationality that preceded it and that is now thwarted at every turn by the postulates of exact composition that twelve-tone technique itself cultivated; rather, it can be accomplished through the absorption of twelve-tone technique by free composition and of its rules by the critical ear. Only from twelve-tone technique can music learn to remain master of itself, but only if it does not become its slave. [emphases added]

page 102

... today the alienation inherent in the consistency of artistic technique itself forms the content of the artwork. [emphasis added] The shocks of the incomprehensible--which artistic technique in the age of its meaninglessness dispenses--reverse. They illuminate the meaningless world. New music sacrifices itself to this. It has taken all of the darkness and guilt of the world on itself. All its happiness is in the knowledge of unhappiness; all its beauty is in denial of the semblance of the beautiful. No one, neither individuals nor groups, wants to have anything to do with it. It dies away unheard, without an echo.

That last part sure seems emo.

Adorno's assertion that there is a fundamental contradiction in occidental music between the polyphonic fugue and the homophonic sonata is an idea that I think is a mere assertion.  It's not even really Adorno's idea, and he didn't make much secret that this juxtaposition or opposition was developed by August Halm.  Halm juxtaposed contrasting principles of development by way of fugue and sonata and thought that ... Bruckner ... represented a compositional approach that could effectively synthesize the two contrasting approaches.  Not being much of a Bruckner fan I'm afraid I can't comment too much on that particular aspect of Halm's writing.

But I will say that I just don't take seriously the idea that there is a contradiction in occidental music between the polyphonic fugue and the homophonic sonata and, even if there were one, there's no reason that the hyper-thematicism of twelve-tone technique would provide a solution to a theoretical impasse.  Ben Johnston, I think, was right to regard twelve-tone technique as an impressive stop-gap effort to find new sounds that did not seem beholden to Romantic era harmonic and melodic cliches, but it was a technique that ensured a whole new era of aural cliches were developed that, unlike those of earlier eras, do not even fasten themselves to our memories.

Adorno could insist that we can't go back to "irrationality", which could be construed to mean that now that newer more technocratic post-tonal methods of composition exist there's no going back to the "intuitive" approach of composing tonal music in the older styles.  The problem is that he's never come up with a coherent or compelling reason why tonality was "used up".  As I have suggested in the case of film critics lamenting the lack of ideas in contemporary cinema, the problem with the perception of cliches may not be with production altogether, it may be over-consumption.  Adorno listened to too much music and in the process of listening to too much music was dismayed to hear so many things that sounded like cliches, even more so than Richard Wagner claiming to hear the clattering of the kitchen work in some music by Mozart.

But what is it supposed to mean that Adorno claims that music has to be emancipated from twelve-tone technique?  Music, which is spectacularly reified in the passage I'm alluding to, must absorb twelve-tone technique into free composition.  Only from twelve-tone technique can music learn to master itself but only if it does not become enslaved to twelve-tone technique.

I'd say that we could just use twelve-tone methods as a way to play with how blues and ragtime riffs can be run forwards, backwards, upside down and then upside down and also backwards over jazz harmonies and still have something that sounds fun ... which is clearly not what Adorno would want any of us to think.  But he was vague in the passage quoted above as to how one could absorb twelve-tone technique into free composition and remain mastery over it.

How about Adorno's claim that "the alienation inherent in the consistency of artistic technique itself forms the content of the artwork." The alienation inherent in the consistency of artistic technique itself forms the content of the artwork?  What does that mean?  Well ... at this point I think it might be fun to cross reference Adorno's ideas with the ideas of Jacques Ellul, who wrote an awful lot considering the nature of technique as an ideology unto itself and the way it suffuses what we could call technocratic societies and what Adorno at times called the administrated society.  Perhaps by way of a paradox the inhumane inhumanity of technique in the arts as a subject unto itself was supposed to provide a meta-commentary on the inhumane humanity of contemporary society.

Well, let's see what Ellul had to say on a few things:

THE EMPIRE OF NON-SENSE: ART IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
Jacques Ellul
Copyright (c) 2014 by Papadakis Publisher
translated by Mikchael Johnson and David Lovekin
ISBN 978-1-906506-40-7

page 52
... Thus, all art is trapped between the desire for revolutionary protests and the technicality of all of its operations, including those that expressed artistic tradition and unique, individual virtuosity. [emphasis added]... Someone claims to be a painter or a musician as an identity and is then recognized as such by a group. This mutual recognition is an intentional awareness that enables the differentiation of a piece of metal in a museum from that which the garage mechanic throws in the trash because it is broken or defective. But the claim of someone who uses the most modern techniques becomes particularly harmful when the message is reactionary; they fight against an art, an aesthetic, and a society that dates from the nineteenth century. They are unaware that using the techniques of the technical system only entrench them more deeply in that system, transforming them into pillars of the current society and not in the one they imagine and fight against. Don Quixotes no longer exist; neither the folly nor the wisdom of Quixote informs. Instead, only a pretentiousness supported by blind ignorance prevails. 

page 53
... Literature and art communicate with ideology because everything has become political. The variations on this formula are endless, but they all say the same thing. They warn against disguised propaganda (for the benefit, of course, of an explicit propaganda although not declared as such); they call for involvement with the ideology of the masses, and they rail against economic constraint, and so on. In its totality, we see here art with a message, which, behind its facade of many Marxist explanations, amounts to little more than an art desperately aligned with a society devoid of signifying power, one of the effects of the technical system.

But, in contrast to committed art, we find a counter current: the technicization of society leads to a disengagement from all forms of message, even that of abstraction, and this absence of message leads to a veritable hypertrophy of technical formalism. [emphasis added] (Moreover, in this current of thought, there are at least two possible positions: for some, art must express the ineffable; for others, it must exclusively create forms. In one case, one could say that abstract art, "neither, in its means or goals, evokes visible manifestations of the world." The inner man is, thus, freed to produce reality as he feels it. The artist reveals the concealed world within himself. But, in the other case, artistic creation becomes its own end. We need only concern ourselves with the production of a text, a color, or a musical score.) One no longer creates anything; rather, one creates a form that has not yet existed. That is all. Artists of the committed stripe will argue that other artists are anti-revolutionary and are running dogs of the bourgeois order. Those of the abstract stripe will condemn their committed brethren as retarded and retrograde and mired down in past delusions, because there is no longer the possibility of any message in the technical realm. Here we find the major schism in the art of our time, which, in all its expressions, is torn asunder.  [emphasis added] There is no single style. ...


page 75
... All creativity is concentrated in technique, and the millions of technical objects attest to this creativity that is so much more dazzling than all that painters or musicians have produced.  ... It is as if this artist were placed in the impossible position of creating on the fringe of society, as if he were standing on the bank of a giant technical current. In society as a whole, this will translate into a movement of intellectual activity to a second degree, to that of reflexivity. We will see a contemplation that, at first, explains but then finally duplicates itself indefinitely.

...page 79
... The artist has entered into the game and translates in his work the essence of technique. He paints, he writes, not on the subject of technique, but rather his work is the profound expression of technique to the extent he is conscious of what he is doing. He does not know technique. The barometer does not discourse on atmospheric pressure; it knows nothing about this. It simply translates it--that is all, just like the truly modern artist. He cannot do otherwise because technique is basically the world in which he lives. [emphasis added] ...

page 112
Now, the decisive importance of theory is found in all the arts.  In music, we have serial music, which at first glance is simply theoretical, especially since its extension, beginning with Arnold Schoenberg and Milton Babbitt, among others, to the domain of measure and dynamics. It becomes a type of mathematical composition. But, from another point of view, the systematic search for analogies between visual symbols and sonorous symbols is also theoretical. The same can be said when one undertakes to reintroduce freedom into musical play: here again this is the result of taking a theoretical stance (John Cage). At any rate, we now have a non-figurative music without reference to either history or to the existing body of sounds.  The influence of theory is, one could say, greater 
in music because it is nonrepresentational and better reflects the forms of thought. A perceptible order of pure theory emerges from the random improvisations of Andrei Markov or in the use of statistical law in certain works of Iannis Xenakis. It becomes a matter of assembling sonorous objects according to a rule or a group of rules that one has set down. Types of experimental music are also 
formed on a theoretical basis because the composers create their experiment on the basis of precise ideas. This experimental music is also divided into schools as a function of theoretical differences: concrete music, electronic music, music for tape (Vladimir Ussachevsky). In all cases, it is a matter of creating new sonorous objects, of not taking account of natural sounds or of customary 
compositions. Music becomes a procedure for organizing new sounds that are totally abstract. Ultimately one could say that theoretical validity is what makes music.  It goes without saying that architecture, like music, lends itself particularly well to this triumph of theory. 
... 
page 118
... We stand in the presence of art of elites for elites. A moderately competent intellectual who does not have the "key" is left out in the cold.  ...

As different as Adorno and Ellul were with respect to metaphysics and, likely, politics, and particularly theology, they did seem, from what we've seen here, agree that there was a core problem in modern art--they both wrote against what they regarded as the emergence of technocratic art in technocratic or "administrative" societies in which the sheer power of formula or technique as a self-sustaining and subject-eradicating system dominates.

Adorno insisted that "today the alienation inherent in the consistency of artistic technique itself forms the content of the artwork." yet he simply asserted this.  Perhaps we can grant he attempted to explain why this was the case in Aesthetic Theory, in which he expounded at some length on the ways in which art devolved into insular technique as technique or unabashed and unadorned propaganda.  But in some ways it seems that Adorno was, for all his writing against capitalism and bourgeois philistinism, was ultimately out to defend what was simply another form of Matthew Arnold style art-religion but with a distinctly high modernist bent.  At length Adorno regarded so much of the new music of the Boulez and Stockhausen variety as basically inhuman, as we've observed elsewhere.

If Adorno regarded serialism and aleatory as ultimately inhuman and inhumane ways of making music was he right to say that?  Those who are fans of Cage or Feldman are apt to say "No."  Those who enjoy the music of Boulez or Carter are apt to say "No."  That Adorno had praise for Varese and Ligeti tells us a little bit about whose work he did actually admire in the mid-twentieth century and I happen to enjoy some works by Varese and quite a few by Ligeti, and it was Ligeti who made a point of remarking on how confining much modernist ideology was.  But what was the core critique Adorno was trying to make?  It would appear to be that, particularly if we cross-reference Adorno's polemics to those of Jacques Ellul, that Adorno was warning that popular culture was mind-destroying non-art that would be wielded be totalitarians (whether formal and explicit fascists or spiritual fascists of the sort Adorno saw emerging in what is now known as new left movements).  On the other hand, high art had devolved into insular technocratic exploration of technique for its own sake.  In both cases, in both extremes Adorno saw what Ellul would call the triumph of technique as ideology over any and every humanistic impulse.  The paradox is that we cannot just ignore that we live in technocratic societies and that technical means are essential for developing any mastery of any art.  At the risk of dating myself a bit ... the paradoxical challenge would be how someone with the training of a Milton Babbitt could have a sense of social engagement that might be of a Fred Rogers variety.  

Adorno seemed to believe that the arts were devolving into blunt propaganda and technocratic isolation. Ellul stated he believed Adorno had best understood and articulated the problems in the arts in technocratic societies.  Ellul was not exactly a Marxist, though, and so his critique of technocratic societies and technocratic praxis and ethos in the arts was not confined to capitalist societies.  He pointed out that if we look at the evolution of avant garde movements on either side of the Iron Curtain that we see similar technical revolutions.  German expressionism in music and early atonality extending the possibilities thought to be latent in the German Romantic style or in French music had counterparts in the post-Scriabin generation of Russian and Soviet composers who were breaking down the octave into smaller-than-half-step intervals, such as Wyschnegradsky, for instance.  In that sense, we can't un-split the atom--now that composers in the East and West have demonstrated how readily we can divide the octave into anywhere between 24 to 78 or more tones equal temperament is not something we're obliged to keep working with in music.  But, and this is where I just make an assertion, Adorno was always wrong to say tonality was "used up".  In saying so he wrote himself into a corner, into a place where tonalilty couldn't be reinvigorated but twelve-tone technique was already devolving into serialist inhumanity.  And, of course, popular musical styles, especially from the United States, were basically off the table.

We don't really have a lot of reason to expect that writers like Adorno or Ellul will have a "solution" to what they regarded as the problems of the arts.  Neither of them even claimed they exactly had solutions.  On the other hand, I've been struck by the ways in which secular Marxist/leftist thought and religious conservatives have dug into their respective trenches in their bodies of literature in the last, well, century--the way to put this in Marxist jargon would be to say that the left has cut itself off and made itself insufficiently dialectical by interacting with itself in a way similar to the ways in which religious conservative writers and conservative writers more generally can engage aesthetic issues and debate the arts in such a way that we have a Roger Scruton who is more or less just recycling the kinds of highbrow arguments Adorno made half a century ago.

It seems that we can do better, where ever we are on the political or religious spectrum, than "just' rehashing arguments that have been made before.  Maybe some of the ways in which we can do better is to restore some kind of synergistic interaction across schools of thought.  I doubt I can play any substantial role of any kind toward that end, but it's something I've been thinking about.